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 ABSTRACT  
We examine the importance of liquidity hoarding and counterparty risk in the U.S. overnight interbank 
market during the financial crisis of 2008. Our findings suggest that counterparty risk plays a larger role 
than does liquidity hoarding: in the two days after Lehman Brothers’ bankruptcy, loan terms become 
more sensitive to borrower characteristics. In particular, whereas poorly performing large banks see an 
increase in spreads of 24 basis points, while borrowing 1% less, on average.  Worse performing banks do 
not hoard liquidity. While the interbank market does not freeze entirely, it does not seem to expand to 
meet latent demand. 
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The overnight interbank market, known as the federal funds market (or fed funds market) in the 
U.S.1, is the most immediate source of liquidity for regulated banks in the U.S. and thus an 
important indicator of the functioning of the banking market overall. Problems in the efficiency 
of interbank markets can lead to inadequate allocation of capital and lack of risk sharing between 
banks. At the extreme, disruptions in interbank markets could even trigger bank runs. In addition, 
interest rates in the overnight interbank market are one of the main targets for implementing 
monetary policy, and thus an important macroeconomic indicator. It is therefore of particular 
interest to understand whether the interbank market mitigates or amplifies shocks to individual 
banks or the banking sector as a whole. While we find evidence of meaningful disruptions in the 
U.S. interbank market after the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers, we do not observe a complete 
freeze in overnight interbank lending.  
The theoretical literature proposes two channels by which shocks to individual banks can 
lead to market-wide reductions in liquidity. One set of models focuses on an increase in 
counterparty risk to explain a drying up of liquidity. For example, Flannery (1996), Freixas and 
Jorge (2008), and Heider, Hoerova, and Holthausen (2009) all examine adverse selection that can 
lead to market unraveling. In these models, information asymmetry becomes worse during a 
crisis when the fraction of risky banks goes up and investors are unable to differentiate among 
the credit risks of individual banks. As a result, lenders need to be paid more to participate in the 
market. If uncertainty becomes very high, the fear of adverse selection can become so great that 
interbank lending might stop altogether.  
A different approach to modeling the role of counterparty risk assumes that lenders in the 
interbank market do not face information asymmetry. Instead, these papers suggest that the 
counterparty risk for some of the banks in the market has increased up to a point where their cost 
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of capital prevents them from accessing the interbank market.  Thus, in a crisis we should see 
greater divergence in the cost of borrowing and in access to liquidity between weaker and 
stronger banks. Examples of this view include Furfine (2001), Flannery and Sorescu (1996), or 
Bruche and Suarez (2010), who discuss an alternative mechanism related to deposit insurance 
that can lead to a freeze.  
A second set of theories emphasizes the importance of liquidity hoarding in interbank 
lending disruptions. In these models, banks are not willing to lend even to high quality 
counterparties because they want to keep liquidity for precautionary reasons. For example, in 
Allen, Carletti, and Gale (2009) and Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2008), banks hoard liquidity 
in anticipation of their own needs or in anticipation of high volatility in asset prices and 
correspondingly high aggregate demand for liquidity. Similarly, in Diamond and Rajan (2009) 
banks hoard liquidity expecting high returns when banks in need of cash are forced to sell at fire 
sale prices. In these models, the perceived future cost of capital for banks is so high that they do 
not want to lend at the prevailing interest rate. This effect should be stronger for lenders that are 
in worse shape or those that rely more heavily on external liquidity.2 As a result, borrowers’ 
access to funds will be reduced regardless of borrower quality.  
We study the Lehman Brothers’ bankruptcy and the ensuing government interventions as 
an example of the market wide-shock to banks modeled in the theoretical literature. While the 
direct losses from Lehman’s failure were not big enough to trigger the immediate bankruptcy of 
any of the large American banks, we interpret Lehman’s bankruptcy as a shock to the market’s 
belief that large banks would not be allowed to fail. We test for the importance of both liquidity 
hoarding and counterparty risk in the aftermath of this shock. Our results lend support to the 
interpretation that heightened concerns about counterparty risk reduced liquidity and increased 
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the cost of finance for weaker banks. We do not find evidence for liquidity hoarding in the 
overnight fed funds market.  
Using daily transaction-level data, we document that under “normal” or pre-crisis 
conditions the fed funds market functions via rationing of riskier borrowers rather than prices, 
for example, via adjustments of spreads.3 However, in the days immediately after the Lehman 
Brothers’ bankruptcy the market becomes more sensitive to bank-specific characteristics, 
especially in the amounts lent to borrowers but also in the cost of overnight funds. In particular, 
large banks with high percentages of non-performing loans (NPLs) showed drastically reduced 
daily borrowing amounts and borrowed from fewer counterparties in the days after Lehman’s 
bankruptcy. However, beginning on Tuesday, September 16, 2008, once the AIG bailout was 
announced, the trend reversed, and spreads for the largest banks fell steeply. We interpret the 
return to pre-crisis spreads as the effect of the government’s support for systematically important 
banks, because the same is not true for small banks, which continued to face higher spreads. This 
reversal supports the idea that concerns over increased counterparty risk were at the heart of the 
observed tensions in the fed funds market, since rates returned to normal levels as soon as the 
government interventions relieved fears of counterparty risk. 
Contrary to the predictions of many models of liquidity hoarding, we do not find a 
relationship between lender characteristics and amounts lent in the days after Lehman’s failure. 
Banks that might be expected to hoard liquidity – such as worse performing banks or banks that 
had been more dependent on repo financing – did not lend less in the interbank market 
immediately after the Lehman Brothers’ bankruptcy. This suggests either that these banks did not 
need to hoard overnight liquidity, or that they did not want to reveal weakness to this market by 
appearing to hoard liquidity. The fact that larger, worse performing banks disproportionately 
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increased their number of counterparties could mean that they wanted to signal their soundness 
to the market. Of course, this interpretation is only suggestive; an alternative explanation could 
be that worse performing lenders differentially sought to diversify their exposure to any single 
borrower. However, regardless of the interpretation of banks’ lending behavior, our results 
suggest that liquidity hoarding was less important than counterparty risk in explaining the 
difficulty many banks had in accessing the fed funds market. Our results seem consistent with 
models that propose increased sensitivity to counterparty risk during times of crisis (in the form 
of higher cost of capital and rationing of credit for weaker banks).  In contrast, we do not find 
evidence that increased information asymmetry leads to higher risk premiums in the market 
overall nor do we find a total market freeze.  
While these results are consistent with the hypothesis that the interbank market became 
more responsive to counterparty risk during the crisis, we cannot test whether the fed funds 
market provided an efficient level of financing since we do not observe the full distribution of 
latent demand and supply. We attempt to measure the extent of unmet demand by examining 
borrowing from the Federal Reserve’s discount window. Because of the higher interest rate and 
potential for stigma, banks usually access the discount window only if they have severe unmet 
liquidity needs. Thus, use of the discount window gives a lower bound for unmet demand in the 
fed funds market. We find that even in the days after the Lehman Brothers’ bankruptcy, only 
poorly performing banks, that is those with low return on assets (ROA), accessed the discount 
window. It seems reasonable to assume that such banks were rationed by private lenders in the 
fed funds market. While again it is difficult to assess whether the level of funding expanded 
efficiently during the crisis, it is reassuring that we do not observe more profitable banks being 
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forced to turn to the discount window. Our results further corroborate the interpretation that 
lenders in the fed funds market were able to screen out the worst performing borrowers.  
Our results are different from the findings of Furfine’s (2002) study of the U.S. interbank 
market around the Russian debt crisis and the collapse of Long Term Capital Management in 
1998. He finds no evidence of either counterparty risk or liquidity hoarding, perhaps because that 
crisis was not severe enough to ignite counterparty risk concerns. Our findings are also different 
from those documented in the U.K. interbank market during the 2007/2008 financial crisis by 
Acharya and Merrouche (2010). The authors find that in the U.K., riskier banks hold more 
reserves relative to expected payment value and the borrowing rates of the 10 largest banks do 
not vary significantly with bank characteristics. They interpret these results as evidence of 
liquidity hoarding. The difference between their findings and ours may reflect the tiered structure 
of the U.K. interbank market (only 15 participants) or the different time period of their study 
(January 2007 to June 2008). It is worth noting that we do not find disruption in the U.S. 
overnight interbank market around the dates that they document.   
Wetherilt, Zimmerman, and Soramäki (2009) find evidence more similar to ours in the U.K. 
unsecured overnight market, documenting a post-crisis reduction in the number of bilateral 
relationships.  In addition, our findings are consistent with Angelini, Nobini, and Picillo (2009), 
who examine Italian banks participating in e-MID (the Italian-based electronic market for 
interbank deposits) and find that the importance of borrower bank characteristics to interbank 
lending rates increases after August 2007. They estimate that more liquid lenders charge higher 
rates after August 2007 (liquidity hoarding), but the economic magnitude of the estimated effect 
is small.4 Finally, Kuo, Skeie, and Vickery (2010) document that while maturities seem to 
shorten, the U.S. term interbank market does not decline dramatically during the early financial 
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crisis period or immediately after Lehman Brothers’ bankruptcy, although they do not analyze 
cross-sectional variation in borrowing. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section I describes in more detail the 
institutional features of the U.S. overnight interbank market as well as of other sources of short-
term liquidity. Section II defines the data sample, and Section III presents an overview of the 
conditions (loan terms and number of active participants) in the fed funds market from March 
through October of 2008. Section IV introduces the construction of the variables used in this 
analysis. The impact of a major shock, namely the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers, is analyzed 
in Section V. Section VI examines borrowing from the discount window as a proxy for unmet 
demand for fed funds and Section VII focuses on the effects of an increase demand for funds that 
may have arisen from disruptions in other overnight funding markets. Section VIII concludes. 
 
I. The Federal Funds Market and Other Funding Sources 
Federal funds are uncollateralized loans of reserve balances at Federal Reserve banks. On a 
daily basis, banks borrow and lend these balances to meet reserve requirements and to clear 
financial transactions. Most loans have an overnight term, although some transactions have 
longer maturities.5 The weighted average rate at which banks lend in the overnight fed funds 
market is known as the fed funds rate.  Fed funds borrowings are accounted for like deposits; 
however, unlike traditional bank deposits, fed funds are exempt from reserve requirements.   
The fed funds market is an over-the-counter market where institutions negotiate loan terms 
directly with each other or indirectly through a fed funds broker. To expedite lending and reduce 
transaction costs, most overnight loans are booked without a contract. These verbal agreements 
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rely on relationships and informal credit lines between borrowing and lending institutions. In 
addition to commercial banks, thrift institutions, and branches of foreign banks in the U.S., 
participants include federal agencies (typically lenders in this market) and government securities 
dealers.  
Depository institutions have several alternatives to the fed funds market to meet their 
overnight funding needs. First, they can borrow in the repo market. A repurchase agreement, or 
repo, is a financial contract that allows the use of a security as collateral for a cash loan, mostly 
on an overnight basis, at a rate known as the repo rate. Since repos are collateralized, the repo 
rate is generally lower than the fed funds rate. 
The repo market is a large and opaque over-the-counter market that exceeded $10 trillion in 
the U.S. in 2008 (Hördahl and King (2008)). Gorton and Metrick (2009) find evidence for a “run 
on repo” in the two weeks following Lehman’s bankruptcy. They estimate that average haircuts 
for non-U.S. Treasury collateral increased from approximately 25% to 43% in these two weeks, 
and argue that this pricing change was the result of concerns about the illiquidity of the assets 
being used as collateral.6 While we cannot directly measure repo borrowing, we proxy for banks’ 
pre-Lehman repo funding with the amount of repo borrowing on banks’ balance sheets at the end 
of 2007. Given the dislocations in the repo market in 2008, we expect banks with high repo 
funding to need more liquidity from other markets after Lehman’s bankruptcy. 
A third source of overnight liquidity is the discount window.7 Unlike fed funds loans, 
borrowing from the discount window is collateralized. However, the Federal Reserve accepts a 
broad range of assets as discount window collateral, including home mortgages and related 
assets, and thus collateral is unlikely to be a limiting factor.8 More importantly, banks have been 
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reluctant to borrow from the discount window because of a perceived “stigma.”9 Federal Reserve 
banks extend primary credit at the discount window on a short-term basis to banks that are 
adequately or well capitalized for up to 90 days at a rate currently 25 basis points above the 
target federal funds rate.10 Discount window loans are typically overnight and allow for early 
repayment of the loan if issued for a longer term. We expect that banks that borrow from the 
discount window are banks that could not meet their liquidity requirements in the fed funds 
market, we study these institutions to see which types of banks may have had unmet fed funds 
demand. 
In this period, banks could also borrow from the Federal Reserve’s Term Auction Facility 
(TAF).11 We focus on discount window lending instead of TAF as the best substitute for 
overnight fed funds because TAF funding is available only on a term basis, cannot be prepaid, 
and can be accessed only on pre-specified dates. 
 
II. Data 
Fed funds data for this analysis come from a proprietary transaction-level data set that contains 
all transfers sent and received by institutions through Fedwire. An institution that maintains an 
account at a Federal Reserve Bank can generally become a Fedwire participant and use this 
account to make large-value payments as well as settle interbank loans. Fed funds loans are thus 
a subset of all Fedwire transactions. We identify transfers as fed funds transactions using an 
algorithm similar to the one proposed by Furfine (1999), which is summarized in the Appendix. 
Similar data are used in Ashcraft and Duffie (2007), Bech and Atalay (2008), and Bartolini, 
Hilton, and McAndrews (2010), among others. These data include the date, amount, interest rate, 
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time of delivery, and time of return as well as the identity of the lender and the borrower of every 
transaction sent over Fedwire. The borrower and lender are identified at the lead American 
Banking Association (ABA) level, which corresponds to a unique identifier assigned to 
institutions by the Federal Reserve (RSSD).  We aggregate the fed funds data at the bank holding 
company level and aggregate loans between each borrower-lender pair on a daily basis, 
calculating the federal funds rate for each borrower-lender pair as a weighted average. 
We augment these data with quarterly information on bank characteristics as filed in the 
Consolidated Financial Statements for Bank Holding Companies (FR Y-9C),12 which provides 
information on credit risk variables, total assets, and financial ratios. In addition, we add 
information from proprietary Federal Reserve databases on reserve requirements and discount 
window borrowing. Data on discount window loans are available daily and include information 
on the borrower, amount borrowed, available collateral, and interest rate. These data are 
described in greater detail by Armantier, Ghysels, and Sarkar (2009) in their analysis of the 
interaction between TAF bidding and discount window borrowing. 
 
III. The Federal Funds Market during the 2007-2008 Crisis 
Despite theoretical predictions and public perception of a collapse in interbank lending 
around financial crises, the overnight federal funds market was remarkably stable through the 
recent period of turmoil in the financial markets. Figures 1 to 3 show the amount, participation, 
and interest rates in the fed funds market from March 3, 2008 to October 8, 2008. We highlight 
two key dates in each figure:13 i) March 16, 2008 – JP Morgan announces that it will acquire 
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Bear Stearns for $2 a share, and ii) September 15, 2008 – Lehman Brothers files for bankruptcy 
after failing to find a merger partner. 
As shown in Figure 1, the daily amount of transactions is surprisingly stable over the period 
considered, hovering around $200 million through the summer of 2008 and even after Lehman’s 
bankruptcy.  Similarly, as shown in Figure 2, the number of borrowers remains relatively stable 
at 150 to 200 banks throughout the Lehman Brothers’ episode. In contrast, the number of lenders 
falls from approximately 250 to 300 in the summer of 2008 to around 250 after Lehman 
Brothers’ bankruptcy. As shown in Figure 3, the daily fed funds rate is relatively stable after the 
Bear Stearns’ episode until Lehman Brothers’ bankruptcy. The weighted average rate jumps 
more than 60 basis points on September 15, 2008, with substantially more widening of the 
distribution. 
[Figures 1 - 3] 
 
IV. Definition of Variables 
To understand the impact of the financial crisis on the fed funds market, we study the period 
surrounding the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers. We begin the pre-Lehman period on April 1, 
2008 so as to avoid the collapse of Bear Stearns and continue the sample through February 28, 
2009 so that there are an equal number of days preceding and following the event.  
Summary statistics for the fed funds market in this time period are presented in Table I. 
While the mean and median amount of daily loans do not fall, the mean spread between banks’ 
fed funds loan rates and the target fed funds rate almost doubles in the days immediately 
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surrounding Lehman’s bankruptcy, and the volatility of spreads increases as well. It is worth 
noting that even in the pre-Lehman period only approximately 30% of borrowers actually borrow 
on any given day. This number falls to 27.5% surrounding Lehman’s bankruptcy, although the 
decline in mean daily borrowers is significantly different from the pre-Lehman period only after 
the Federal Reserve begins to pay interest on excess reserves (October 2008).  
[Table I]  
Table II shows characteristics for all borrowing and lending banks in the sample. The 
borrower sample has only borrowers with Y-9C data so that we can measure banks’ 
characteristics consistently. It includes loans from all lenders to these borrowers, including 
amounts borrowed from government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs) and U.S. subsidiaries of 
foreign banking organizations. As summarized in Table II, the median borrower in this market 
has more than $1 billion in assets (the mean is $28 billion) and NPLs of 0.8% of total loans as of 
December 31, 2007 (the mean level of NPLs is 1.1%). The lender sample is different from the 
borrower sample, because it has only lenders with Y-9C data. Loans from GSEs and U.S. 
subsidiaries of foreign banking organizations are excluded, but we do not exclude loans to those 
entities. The median lender in this market has characteristics that are similar to those of the 
median borrower, with close to $1 billion in assets and NPLs of 0.8% of total loans as of 
December 31, 2007.  Again the mean values are $26 billion and 1.3%, respectively.  
[Table II]  
For the analysis in Tables III to VII we aggregate the data into two samples so that we 
can examine the importance of both borrower and lender characteristics. The first sample, in 
which we aggregate all fed funds loans to each borrower in a day, consists of 21,003 
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observations from 360 borrowers. The second sample, in which we aggregate all fed funds loans 
from each lender in a day, consists of 26,700 observations from 376 lenders. Each analysis is 
conducted with one observation per borrower-day (lender-day).  
We allow market conditions to vary in different windows around the bankruptcy of Lehman 
Brothers, selecting breakpoints around the following events: 
• September 15, 2008 – Lehman Brothers files for bankruptcy (pre-market open) 
• September 16, 2008 – Federal Reserve loans $85 billion to AIG (after market close) 
• October 9, 2008 – Federal Reserve begins to pay interest on required and excess reserve 
balances (IOR)14 
• October 14, 2008 – Nine large banks agree to capital injection from Treasury (Capital 
Purchase Program (CPP)).15 
We indicate with binary variables the following time periods: two weeks pre-Lehman 
(August 29, 2008 to September 4, 2008), one week pre-Lehman (September 5, 2008 to 
September 11, 2008), Friday September 12, 2008, Monday September 15, 2008, Tuesday 
September 16, 2008, post-AIG and pre-IOR (September 17, 2008 to October 8, 2008), post-IOR 
and pre-CPP (October 9, 2008 to October 13, 2008), and monthly after CPP (October 14, 2008 to 
November 10, 2008 and thereafter). While controls for all time periods are included in all 
specifications, we present coefficients only through the post-AIG and pre-IOR period in the 
tables due to size limitations. Tables with all estimated coefficients are available in the Internet 
Appendix.16  
We analyze three variables to assess conditions in the fed funds market: price, amount, and 
number of counterparties. We measure the price of fed funds with the weighted average spread 
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between the rate for each bank and the target federal funds rate on a given day.17 The amount of 
fed funds loans is calculated as the log of the total amount borrowed in $ millions plus one. We 
include in this analysis only banks that were observed borrowing in the market at any time from 
April 1, 2008 to February 28, 2009.18 Finally we calculate the number of counterparties as the 
log of the number of different lenders (borrowers) in a given day. We also tabulate the daily 
percentage of the number of banks borrowing, by dividing the number of unique borrowers by 
the 360 banks that borrowed in the sample time period (April 2008 to February 2009).  
 
V. The Effects of Shocks to the Interbank Market 
In the following analyses we want to shed light on the functioning of the fed funds market in 
the aftermath of a major shock to the banking industry, namely the bankruptcy of Lehman 
Brothers. Our objective is to document which banks were able to access the market after the 
onset of the Lehman crisis and at what terms. One view is that this shock led to a market-wide 
collapse of the fed funds market and prevented even banks that are good credit risks from 
accessing to the market. Accordingly, we look at different dimensions of access to credit such as 
the interest rate at which banks borrow, the amount of the loan, and the number of 
counterparties. The last two are particularly important since many participants in the fed funds 
market suggest that credit risk is managed via credit rationing rather than interest rates. 
In Table III we first look at the effect of Lehman’s bankruptcy on the fed funds market with 
and without controlling for fixed bank borrower characteristics. This allows us to separate the 
effect of the crisis on a given bank from the composition effects of who was able to access the 
interbank market after the Lehman crisis. The first column is a probit estimation with a 
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dependent variable equal to one if a bank borrows on a given day. We do not estimate a probit 
model with borrower fixed effects because fixed effects for the 20 banks that borrow every day 
(including the period around Lehman’s bankruptcy) would predict access perfectly and thus be 
excluded from the analysis, distorting the results.19 The dependent variable in the next two 
columns is the spread to target (the difference between the weighted average interest rate for a 
given bank and the target interest rate).  Columns (4) and (5) report the effect on the logarithm of 
the amount borrowed and the dependent variable in columns (6) and (7) is the logarithm of the 
number of counterparties for a given borrower. Standard errors are clustered at the bank level. 
Results are robust to clustering at both the bank and time period levels.  
[Table III]  
In contrast to theoretical predictions of a cessation in trading, without controlling for bank 
fixed effects there does not seem to be much happening in the two days following Lehman’s 
bankruptcy. While the probit estimation suggests that access to the interbank market decreased 
around Lehman’s bankruptcy, the change to the market is not the abrupt cessation of activity 
predicted by both counterparty and liquidity hoarding theories. Rather than a sudden large 
negative coefficient immediately after Lehman’s bankruptcy, we estimate small negative 
coefficients beginning in August 2008. These negative coefficients become significantly more 
negative only after the Federal Reserve pays interest on reserves. Also, there is no statistically 
significant change in the amount borrowed (column (4)) or the number of counterparties (column 
(6)). Spreads increase on Monday, September 15, but begin falling thereafter (column (2)). 
Results are similar when the data are grouped by lender and we control for fixed lender 
characteristics, and when data are included for all borrowers and all lenders (see the Internet 
Appendix). 
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But these results hide a dramatic shift in the flow of funds and the distribution of rates across 
different borrowers. When we include borrower fixed effects in column (5) the coefficient on the 
post-Lehman dummy is negative and significant with a coefficient estimate of -0.19 on 
September 15. The economic effect is economically large since a point estimate of -0.19 
translates into a reduction in borrowing of 17.3%. The results suggest that while after Lehman’s 
bankruptcy the average loan size of banks in the fed funds market did not drop (Table III, 
column (4)), for any given bank the amount borrowed decreased (column (5)). These two 
seemingly contradictory effects can only be reconciled if there is a change in the composition of 
banks that are borrowing in the market: larger banks or those banks that were able to borrow 
larger amounts must have accessed the interbank market less often after Lehman’s bankruptcy. 
Therefore, the average loan in the sample is unchanged, while at the same time the average bank 
in the sample sees a decline in the amount borrowed. It seems that those banks that usually 
borrow a lot and often from the market were the ones facing very different borrowing terms or 
even losing access, while banks that use the market less seem to have increased their borrowing.  
Similarly, column (7) shows that there is a reduction in the number of counterparties a bank 
borrows from post-Lehman only after including borrower fixed effects. The coefficient on the 
post-Lehman dummy is negative in the cross-section but not significant. This suggests that a 
given borrower in the sample borrows from fewer counterparties post-Lehman. Even those banks 
that are able to access the fed funds market after Lehman’s bankruptcy borrow from a smaller 
number of counterparties.  
It is important to note that when including borrower fixed effects in Table III the adjusted-R2 
jumps dramatically. So clearly bank characteristics are an important determinant of banks’ 
borrowing in the fed funds market. In fact, including only borrower characteristics such as assets, 
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ROA, NPL levels, and risk ratios instead of bank fixed effects, we can explain about 70% of the 
cross-sectional variation of bank borrowing.  
In Tables IV to VII we begin to disentangle the impact of the Lehman Brothers’ 
bankruptcy on banks of different size and performance metrics. If lenders respond to the crisis by 
hoarding liquidity, we would expect to find an aggregate decrease in amounts lent as well as 
worse performing banks lending less. In contrast, if uncertainty about counterparty risk increases 
but banks can still distinguish among risks, we would expect to find worse performing banks 
borrowing less and/or paying higher prices.  
We first estimate a probit specification where the dependent variable is a binary variable, 
Accessb,t, equal to one when banks borrow (lend): 
ܣܿܿ݁ݏݏ௕,௧ ൌ ߚሺܦܽݐ݁ሻ ൅ ߜ൫ܦܽݐ݁ ൈ  ܺ௕,ଶ଴଴଻൯ ൅ ߛ൫ܦܽݐ݁ ൈ ܣݏݏ݁ݐݏ௕,ଶ଴଴଻൯ ൅ ߝ௕,௧.   (1) 
Then, for each of the fed funds terms Fb,t (spread to target, log amount, and log number of 
counterparties), we estimate 
ܨ௕,௧ ൌ ߚሺܦܽݐ݁ሻ ൅ ߜ൫ܦܽݐ݁ ൈ  ܺ௕,ଶ଴଴଻൯ ൅ ߛ൫ܦܽݐ݁ ൈ ܣݏݏ݁ݐݏ௕,ଶ଴଴଻൯ ൅ ߠ ቀ
ಲ೘೚ೠ೙೟್,೟
ಲೞೞ೐೟ೞ್,మబబళ
ቁ ൅ ߙ௕ ൅ ߝ௕,௧,  (2) 
where b indexes bank borrowers or lenders, t indexes time in days, Date is a vector of dummy 
variables equal to one in the time period of interest and zero otherwise, X b,2007 is the bank 
characteristic of interest such as % NPLs measured as of December 31, 2007, Assetsb,2007 are 
bank borrower or lender assets as of December 31, 2007, Amountb,t is the amount borrowed or 
lent in the fed funds market (not included when the dependent variable is amount), and εb,t is an 
error term. The fed funds terms specifications include αb fixed effects for bank borrowers 
(lenders).  
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We consider characteristics of borrowing (lending) banks in two ways. First, we split the 
sample into three equally sized bins by asset size. The smallest banks are those with less than 
$937 million in assets, and the largest have more than $3.5 billion. In the fed funds terms 
specifications (Tables IV to VII), there are fewer observations in the smaller bank group, because 
smaller banks are less frequent borrowers (both in the pre- and post-crisis periods). We estimate 
the same specifications separately for each size group, allowing all of the coefficients to vary 
with bank size. We present the coefficients for the largest and smallest banks to show how 
pricing changes differently for large and small banks. When the difference in coefficients 
between columns is statistically significant, the coefficients are shown in bold type. This format 
was selected for expositional clarity. Results were qualitatively similar when estimated with 
different size breakpoints and using an interaction between assets and the explanatory variables. 
It is worth emphasizing that the fed funds terms regressions include borrower (lender) fixed 
effects. Our identification therefore is only driven by changes in the sensitivity of fed funds 
terms to banks’ pre-crisis characteristics. That means we estimate a change in the slope of the 
relationship between bank characteristics and fed funds’ loan amounts and pricing. 
Since the fed funds terms specifications already include controls for bank fixed effects, 
splitting the sample by asset size also allows us to see if the time period effect is different for 
banks of different sizes. We also control for the interaction of asset size and the date dummies in 
each specification shown in Table IV to Table VII, although these coefficients are not presented 
in the tables due to size limitations (results are available in the Internet Appendix). In 
specifications with spread or counterparties as the dependent variable, we control for the 
interaction of amount borrowed divided by asset size and the date dummies in each specification, 
although these coefficients are not presented in the tables. We next add the interaction of bank 
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characteristics such as the percentage of NPLs with time period dummies to the specifications 
sorted by bank size. The end result is effectively a triple difference-in-difference estimation, 
testing to see if the market becomes more sensitive to these underlying characteristics in the 
post-Lehman period, and if the fed funds borrowing of small and large banks is differentially 
sensitive to these characteristics.  
We first test to see if borrowing (lending) is associated with borrower (lender) 
characteristics (Table IV). We find that large borrowers and lenders access the fed funds market 
less after Lehman’s bankruptcy. Furthermore, it is the worst performing large banks that access 
the market least to borrow – the coefficient on % NPL is negative and statistically significant for 
large borrowers. Surprisingly, this pattern is reversed for lenders – the worst performing large 
lenders are actually more likely to lend on the Monday and Tuesday following Lehman’s 
bankruptcy.  
[Table IV] 
Table V examines how interbank lending rates for large and small banks changed after 
the Lehman Brothers’ bankruptcy. While smaller borrowers see an increase in spreads of over 94 
basis points on Monday, larger borrowers observe no significant increase in their spreads. Post-
Lehman spread changes are similar for small and large lenders. In columns (3), (4), (7), and (8) 
we add interactions of the post-Lehman dummies with NPLs as a proxy for borrower and lender 
quality.20 Immediately after Lehman’s bankruptcy, the relationship between spreads and quality 
is no different from that for the pre-crisis period.  
[Table V] 
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These results underscore again that interest rates in the fed funds markets did not become 
increasingly sensitive to bank performance metrics in a consistent manner. Yet this does not 
necessarily mean that lenders are not concerned about the counterparty risk of banks. Rather, the 
results suggest that lenders seem to be more likely to manage their risk exposure by the amount 
they lend to a particular bank or even whether they lend to the bank at all. The fact that interest 
rates go up for the smaller banks but not for the larger banks does not necessarily constitute a 
flight to size. In contrast, these trends could be driven by rationing in the market. If only smaller 
banks are able to access the fed funds market after the Lehman Brothers shock but at higher 
rates, we could find higher rates for smaller banks. But in this case the higher rate is an 
indication that only smaller banks are able to access the market, while large banks are not. The 
results of the next two tables provide additional evidence that corroborates this interpretation. 
We next describe in Table VI the daily amount borrowed and lent by banks in the fed 
funds market. Interestingly, we see a difference in the effect on larger versus smaller banks that 
comes through differences in bank quality. The decline in borrowing on September 15 is largest 
for large banks with high amounts of NPLs (-49.2). This means that the reduction in loan 
amounts after Lehman for large banks is concentrated in banks with more NPLs (Table VI, 
column (3)).  
[Table VI] 
Borrowers with higher quality metrics are able to access larger loans in the fed funds 
market on September 15. The negative coefficient on the interaction between NPLs and the 
Monday dummy shows that banks with higher NPLs are associated with lower borrowing post-
Lehman.21 The relationship is also economically large. For example, a bank with one standard 
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deviation higher NPLs will borrow approximately $1.55 million less (1% of median large bank 
borrowing of $209 million) on September 15.  These results underscore that banks manage their 
risk exposure in the interbank market via rationing of loan amounts rather than interest rates. 
Large banks with high percentages of NPLs continue to borrow less even after the Federal 
Reserve’s investment in AIG was announced after the market closed on September 16. We found 
similar results when we estimated similar specifications looking only at a binary measure of 
whether a bank accessed the market. The importance of bank characteristics to their fed funds 
borrowing is evidence for the role of counterparty risk in this market. However, lenders 
discriminate among quantities offered to banks rather than withdrawing from the market 
completely.  
In contrast, lender characteristics such as NPLs are not associated with changes in the 
amount lent immediately after Lehman Brothers’ bankruptcy. This means that even riskier banks 
did not hoard funds on the Monday and Tuesday after Lehman’s failure. It is impossible to know 
if these lenders were trying to send a positive signal to the interbank market or simply did not 
want to hoard cash. Whatever the reason, our findings are not consistent with liquidity hoarding. 
Finally, in Table VII we look at the number of counterparties. We again begin by splitting 
the specification between the smallest and largest banks. Controlling for amount borrowed, we 
see a sharp difference in the number of counterparties for smaller versus large borrowers. The 
direct effect of the Monday (September 15) dummy now turns positive for smaller borrowers 
while the coefficient for large borrowers is negative and highly significant; the point estimate is -
0.129. Large banks see a statistically significant reduction in counterparties they borrow from 
while smaller banks have more counterparties immediately post-Lehman. Smaller banks do not 
seem to be as strongly affected by the Lehman shock. In fact, the market was functioning well 
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enough that small banks were able to add more counterparties in order to maintain their level of 
borrowing from the market. The reduction in counterparties for larger banks appears to be driven 
by larger banks with worse performance (as measured by NPLs). In contrast, smaller banks’ 
number of counterparties does not appear to be associated with performance.  
[Table VII] 
We find an interesting relationship between lender characteristics and counterparties. For 
every additional 1% in NPLs, larger lenders increase their counterparties by 8% on September 
15. Effectively, worse performing larger banks are distributing the same amount of money to 
more counterparties – spreading the signal that they are lending to even more banks. We do not 
see a similar increase in counterparties for small lenders, perhaps because it is more difficult for 
them to quickly increase counterparties. 
Overall, we show that large banks that borrow in the fed funds market see a sharp increase in 
spreads and a drop in loan amounts immediately following Lehman’s bankruptcy. These effects 
are particularly strong for large banks with high NPL levels. In contrast, small banks do not 
experience the same decline in loan amounts. However, immediately before the Federal 
Reserve’s $85 billion loan to AIG is announced we see that spreads for large banks return to pre-
crisis levels or below. These results suggest that Lehman’s bankruptcy led to a change in beliefs 
in the interbank market about whether the authorities would let big banks fail. In response we see 
that lenders in the fed funds market started to both price the credit risk of and reduce exposure to 
poorly performing large banks (rather than a complete freeze of the market). However, as soon 
as the AIG loan is announced the fear of counterparty risk for large banks is alleviated and loan 
amounts and spreads go back to pre-crisis levels. In contrast, we do not see any significant 
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changes in worse performing banks’ average lending amounts in response to the crisis. There is 
some evidence that larger banks lend to more counterparties. These results do not seem 
consistent with liquidity hoarding by banks in the overnight interbank market. 
 
VI. Discount Window Analysis 
One concern with the preceding analysis is that observed transactions are the result of the 
intersection of supply and demand for funds. To cleanly differentiate between supply and 
demand effects we would need to observe the levels of and changes in banks’ (unmet) liquidity 
demand and supply. Such observations are very difficult to obtain since they entail knowing the 
amount and interest rate schedule at which each bank would have liked to borrow.  
The overnight interbank market provides a rare opportunity to observe latent demand. In 
particular, we obtain daily data on the amount of loans that banks draw from the discount 
window. Borrowing from the discount window is a near perfect proxy for latent or unmet 
demand for fed funds: discount window loans are provided by the Federal Reserve at the same 
periodicity as fed funds, that is, as daily overnight loans.  While discount window loans are 
collateralized, collateral is unlikely to be a limiting factor for discount window access. Further, 
the discount window can be accessed at the end of the day, allowing banks first to transact in the 
fed funds market. The discount window rate is higher, however, than the target fed funds rate 
(the rate has been 25 basis points higher than the target rate since March 17, 2008 and was 50 
basis points higher prior to that date).   In addition, accessing the discount window is associated 
with a stigma. Banks thus resort to this form of liquidity only if they are shut out from other 
forms of funding. 
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We first analyze whether the level of borrowing from the discount window increased 
dramatically after Lehman’s bankruptcy. Similar to the analysis in Table IV, we include in the 
sample all banks that borrowed from the fed funds market from April 2008 to February 2009, 
and indicate with a binary variable equal to one if they accessed the discount window.22 If the 
main predictor of accessing the discount window is poor past performance, we infer that the fed 
funds market is allocating funds to better banks, which would be consistent with the predicted 
demand shortfalls of weaker banks. However if we instead see that even banks with good past 
performance have to go to the discount window to meet their liquidity needs in the post-Lehman 
period, this would be a sign of dysfunction in the fed funds market.  
In column (1) of Table VIII we use a probit estimator of the likelihood that a bank goes to the 
discount window pre- and post-Lehman controlling for the interest rate and lending amount this 
bank had in its last transaction on the fed funds market. There is a clear increase in the likelihood 
of accessing the discount window, especially on Monday, September 15, when 14 of the 360 fed 
funds borrowers borrowed from the discount window.  Of the 14 discount window borrowers, 
only five also borrowed in the fed funds market on September 15.  In specifications (2) to (5) we 
explore the likelihood that a bank accesses the discount window as a function of bank 
characteristics and its past borrowing behavior in the fed funds market. We find a very strong 
and economically large correlation between ROA and the likelihood of accessing the discount 
window. Only banks that have very poor performance as measured by ROA turn to the discount 
window. We find similar results with NPL on Tuesday September 16, but the NPL results are not 
statistically significant in every time period, perhaps because the number of banks accessing the 
window is quite small. 
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In summary, while we cannot rule out that some banks were screened out of the market it 
appears that the turmoil in the interbank market could not have been so great that solvent banks 
in sound condition had to turn to the discount window for liquidity. This provides evidence that 
the interbank market was not completely frozen during the crisis. 
[Table VIII]  
 
VII. Shocks to Other Funding Sources of Banks 
To proxy for changing demand for fed funds we exploit disruptions in other overnight 
funding markets to identify banks that might have increased demand for overnight fed funds. 
According to market participants, in normal times banks seek liquidity in both fed funds and repo 
markets and substitute between these markets depending on pricing (subject to collateral 
availability). As Gorton and Metrick (2009) show, the repo market was severely disrupted after 
Lehman’s failure, with dramatically increased haircuts and pricing. Therefore, to the extent that 
these two markets are substitutes, post-Lehman fed funds borrowing demand should increase for 
banks that historically funded a larger percentage of their assets with repo borrowing. We 
examine the relationship between bank borrowing (lending) and changes in access to the 
overnight repo markets in Tables IX and X.  
In Tables IX and X, we divide the sample into terciles based on the level of repos sold 
under agreement to repurchase divided by assets as of December 31, 2007 (%Repo). Banks in the 
bottom tercile have %Repo less than 0.00176 and banks in the top tercile have %Repo greater 
than or equal to 0.03721. Comparing the estimated coefficients from the bottom and top terciles 
allows us to see if results from our previous estimations are different for banks with high and low 
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values of repo financing. As before, the dependent variable in the first two columns is spread to 
target, in the next two columns the logarithm of amount, and in the final two columns the 
logarithm of the number of counterparties.  
Table IX examines the impact of increased liquidity demand for borrowers while Table X 
summarizes the identical analysis for lenders. Controlling for % NPL, the coefficients in column 
(4) are higher than those in column (3) of Table IX (although the difference is not statistically 
significant) in the three days immediately surrounding Lehman’s bankruptcy (second to fourth 
rows), indicating that banks that should have higher demand for fed funds loans are not 
increasing their borrowing more than banks that do not have reduced access to an important 
source of overnight funding. If pre-crisis reliance on repo funding is an indicator of increased 
liquidity demand post-Lehman, our results suggest that lending in the fed funds market did not 
expand in response to increased demand, not even for the best of these borrowers (those with low 
NPL levels). 
Just as borrowers that relied on the repo market for overnight financing should have 
higher demand for fed funds, lenders that relied on the repo market for overnight financing might 
reduce their supply of fed funds when the repo market dried up. We see that in many cases the 
coefficients in column (4) of Table X are lower than the coefficients in column (3) (second to 
fourth rows) after Monday, September 15, although the difference is not statistically significant. 
Again, this effect is reversed for lenders with higher NPLs. Lenders with high NPLs and high 
repos actually lend more than do lenders with high NPLs and low repos, although the difference 
is statistically significant only in some time periods.   
[Tables IX X] 
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Finally, we attempt to estimate fed funds market demand by estimating the pre-crisis 
relationship between fed funds borrowing, borrower characteristics, and macroeconomic 
variables.23 We use the estimates from the pre-crisis specification to predict post-crisis demand 
and calculate the difference between predicted demand and actual borrowing. Of course, this 
methodology assumes that the estimated pre-crisis relationships are similar to post-crisis 
relationships. While this may not be the case, predicted demand based on pre-crisis correlations 
remains an interesting counterfactual. 
We create a variable “forecast error” as the difference between actual borrowing and 
predicted borrowing and then see if bank characteristics are associated with actual borrowing 
being significantly below predicted borrowing. When forecast error is high, predicted borrowing 
is higher than actual borrowing, suggesting the possibility of unmet demand. As expected, 
predicted borrowing is much higher than actual borrowing immediately following Lehman’s 
bankruptcy.  Post-crisis borrowing shortfalls are associated with low quality banks (high NPLs) 
experiencing higher shortfalls, although the difference is not always statistically significant.24 
Further evidence that the overnight fed funds market may not have expanded to meet 
increased demand comes from the U.S. term fed funds market.  Kuo, Skeie, and Vickery (2010) 
find that the average term amount outstanding after Lehman Brothers’ bankruptcy (from 
September 15, 2008 to November 11, 2008) was $26 billion lower than the previous average 
amount outstanding (from August 9, 2007 to September 12, 2008), although the decrease in 
amounts does not seem to happen immediately after September 15.  This reduction in term 
funding was not accompanied by an increase in aggregate overnight fed funds outstanding.   
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VIII. Conclusions 
This research presents a first detailed look at the events in the fed funds market during the 
2008 financial crisis. We find evidence of the importance of counterparty risk in the fed funds 
market, but we do not find evidence that riskier lenders were more likely to hoard liquidity at the 
height of the crisis. In the immediate aftermath of Lehman’s bankruptcy we see that the 
overnight interbank market becomes sensitive to bank-specific characteristics, not only in the 
amounts lent to borrowers but even in the cost of funds. We find sharp differences between large 
and small banks in their access to credit: large banks show reduced amounts of daily borrowing 
after Lehman’s bankruptcy and borrow from fewer counterparties. Assuming that in the very 
short run banks do not change their demand for liquidity, this is likely to be an effect of credit 
rationing. In contrast, smaller banks were able to increase the amount borrowed from the 
interbank market and even managed to add lending counterparties during the crisis. Moreover, 
we do not observe the complete cessation of lending predicted by some theoretical models. 
We also document that only the worst performing banks in terms of ROA accessed the 
Federal Reserve’s discount window after Lehman’s bankruptcy. It seems reasonable to assume 
that these are banks that were rationed by the fed funds market since private banks were not 
willing to lend to them. While again it is difficult to assess whether this means that interbank 
markets operated efficiently during the crisis, it is reassuring that we do not observe well-
performing banks having to turn to the discount window. Such a finding would have been a very 
alarming indication of dysfunction in the fed funds market.  
This research is only a first step in understanding how the fed funds market was affected by 
the financial crisis and how robust this market is against financial contagion. Future research 
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should investigate more directly how lenders in the market react to changes in the perception of 
risk. For instance, we need to better understand how fed funds loans are priced and how they are 
affected by expectations about government and central bank interventions. The same is true for 
the decision of whether to add or drop counterparties. Finally, we believe that it would be useful 
to investigate the role that banking relationships and repeated interactions in the fed funds market 
can play in the monitoring of counterparty risks or in the coinsurance of liquidity needs. 
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Figure 1. Daily amount of federal funds transactions ($ billions). The figure shows the aggregate daily amount borrowed in 
the fed funds market (in U.S. $ billions) from March 3, 2008 to October 8, 2008.  The arrows indicate the following dates: i) 
March 16, 2008 – JP Morgan announces that it will acquire Bear Stearns for $2 a share, ii) March 18, 2008 – Federal Reserve 
Open Market Committee (FOMC) lowers target overnight federal funds rate 75 basis points to 2.25%, iii) April 30, 2008 – 
FOMC lowers target overnight federal funds rate 25 basis points to 2.00%, and iv) September 15, 2008 – Lehman Brothers files 
for bankruptcy after failing to find a merger partner. 
 
 
Figure 2. Daily number of borrowers and lenders. The figure shows the daily number of borrowers and lenders in the fed 
funds market from March 3, 2008 to October 8, 2008.  The arrows indicate the following dates: i) March 16, 2008 – JP Morgan 
announces that it will acquire Bear Stearns for $2 a share, ii) March 18, 2008 – FOMC lowers target overnight federal funds rate 
75 basis points to 2.25%, iii) April 30, 2008 – FOMC lowers target overnight federal funds rate 25 basis points to 2.00%, and iv) 
September 15, 2008 – Lehman Brothers files for bankruptcy after failing to find a merger partner. 
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Figure 3. Daily fed funds rates. The figure shows the weighted average daily fed funds rate as well as the daily fed funds rate 
for the 25th and 75th percentiles of borrowers from March 3, 2008 to October 8, 2008.  The arrows indicate the following dates: i) 
March 16, 2008 – JP Morgan announces that it will acquire Bear Stearns for $2 a share, ii) March 18, 2008 – FOMC lowers 
target overnight federal funds rate 75 basis points to 2.25%, iii) April 30, 2008 – FOMC lowers target overnight federal funds 
rate 25 basis points to 2.00%, and iv) September 15, 2008 – Lehman Brothers files for bankruptcy after failing to find a merger 
partner. 
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Table I 
Fed Funds Market Summary Statistics 
The sample consists of 21,003 observations from 360 borrowers from April 1, 2008 to February 28, 2009.  The first three 
variables include one observation per borrower-day, and the final variable consists of one observation per day. 
  Obs.  25% Median Mean 75% StdDev. 
Pre-Lehman (4/1 - 9/11):             
Spread to Target 12,391 0.0112 0.1006 0.1260 0.2250 0.1941 
Amount ($M) 12,391 20.0 70.0 1,234.3 395.0 4,069.4 
Counterparties (#) 12,391 1.0 2.0 7.6 8.0 13.9 
Borrowers / Day (%) 115 27.8 30.3 29.9 31.7 2.8 
Surrounding Lehman (9/12 - 9/16)             
Spread to Target 297 0.0000 0.1875 0.2234 0.5000 0.6173 
Amount ($M) 297 20.0 85.0 1,264.1 423.2 4,327.7 
Counterparties (#) 297 1.0 2.0 7.4 8.0 13.1 
Borrowers / Day (%) 3 26.9 27.5 27.5 28.1 0.6 
Post-Lehman (9/17 - 2/28)             
Spread to Target 8,315 -0.4905 0.1000 -0.0399 0.2835 0.5281 
Amount ($M) 8,315 20.0 85.0 1,331.9 465.0 4,204.0 
Counterparties 8,315 1.0 2.0 5.9 7.0 8.9 
Borrowers / Day (%) 111 18.3 20.3 20.8 22.8 3.2 
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Table II 
 Fed Funds Participant Summary Statistics 
The sample for borrowers consists of 21,003 observations from 360 borrowers from April 1, 2008 to February 28, 2009.  The 
sample for lenders consists of 26,700 observations from 376 lenders from April 1, 2008 to February 28, 2009.  Note that 
Nonperforming Loans (%) and Repurchase Agreements (%) are in percentage format here, but are in decimal format for all 
specifications. 
  Obs.  25% Median Mean 75% StdDev. 
Borrower Characteristics:             
Nonperforming Loans (%) 360 0.4148 0.8252 1.1424 1.3581 1.4801 
Assets ($M) 360 487 1,403 27,832 4,684 176,337 
Repurchase Agreements (%) 360 0.0000 1.7068 3.1951 5.2044 3.8930 
              
Lender Characteristics:             
Nonperforming Loans (%) 376 0.2442 0.7781 1.2894 1.4328 1.9332 
Assets ($M) 376 325 831 26,184 3,312 172,577 
Repurchase Agreements (%) 376 0.0000 0.6372 2.6752 3.8593 4.1637 
              
Fed Funds Variables:             
Spread to Target 21,003 -0.0076 0.1001 0.0617 0.2500 0.3807 
Amount ($M) 21,003 20.0 75.0 1,273.4 425.0 4,127.0 
Counterparties (#) 21,003 1.0 2.0 6.9 8.0 12.2 
Total Amount ($M) 229 109,313.5 125,032.2 122,392.8 139,279.3 23,467.1 
Target Rate (%) 229 1.0 2.0 1.4 2.0 0.8 
Fed Funds Rate (%) 229 0.2492 1.9509 1.3390 2.0435 0.8890 
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Table III 
Dependent Variables, Borrowers 
The sample used in column (1) consists of 81,576 observations from 360 borrowers from April 1, 2008 to February 28, 2009, where observations have been filled in with 0’s on 
days banks do not borrow.  The sample used in columns (2) to (7) consists of 21,003 observations from 360 borrowers from April 1, 2008 to February 28, 2009, where only banks 
that borrow are present.  The dependent variables are Access (Fed Funds), Spread to Target, Amount, and Counterparties.  Standard errors are clustered at the bank level.  ***, **, 
and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
Access Spread to Target Amount Counterparties
Probit OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
1 week pre-Lehman (9/5-9/11) -0.095 *** -0.022 *** -0.017 ** 0.016  -0.033  0.059  0.008  
(0.037) (0.008) (0.007) (0.104) (0.055) (0.056) (0.037)
Friday (9/12) -0.063  0.067 *** 0.076 *** -0.059  -0.076  0.030  0.002  
(0.047) (0.011) (0.008) (0.152) (0.082) (0.073) (0.049)
Monday (9/15) -0.080 * 0.242 *** 0.253 *** 0.010  -0.190 ** -0.029  -0.122 **
(0.046) (0.087) (0.087) (0.150) (0.093) (0.075) (0.053)
Tuesday (9/16) -0.097 ** -0.021  -0.013  0.070  -0.096  0.035  -0.062  
(0.047) (0.053) (0.049) (0.141) (0.076) (0.073) (0.050)
Post-AIG, pre-IOR (9/17-10/8) -0.148 *** -0.224 *** -0.229 *** -0.050  -0.249 *** 0.035  -0.096 **
(0.032) (0.037) (0.036) (0.094) (0.063) (0.050) (0.038)
Borrower Fixed Effects No No Yes No Yes No Yes
N 81,576 21,003 21,003 21,003 21,003 21,003 21,003
Adjusted-R2 0.27 0.51 0.00 0.86 0.00 0.83
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Table IV 
Impact of the Lehman Event on Access 
The sample for borrowers consists of 81,576 observations from 360 borrowers from April 1, 2008 to February 28, 2009.  The 
sample for lenders consists of 84,853 observations from 376 lenders from April 1, 2008 to February 28, 2009.  We divide the 
samples into terciles, where Large is the top tercile of assets and Small is the bottom tercile of assets.  The dependent variable is 
Access (Federal Funds).  All specifications include controls for the interaction of Assets and the time period dummies.  Bank 
characteristics are measured as of the Call Report as of December 2007.  Standard errors are clustered at the bank level.  ***, **, 
and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. a, b, and c indicate the difference between the 
coefficients of the Large and Small banks is statistically significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
 
Borrowers  Lenders
Large Small Large Small
(1) (2) (3) (4)
1 week pre-Lehman (9/5-9/11) -4.102 *** b -1.070 b -1.800 *** -0.195
(0.976) (1.165) (0.614) (0.829)
Friday (9/12) -3.888 *** -2.352 -1.764 ** b 0.566 b
(1.101) (2.245) (0.739) (0.890)
Monday (9/15) -6.038 *** b -1.071 b -2.349 *** b 0.347 b
(1.705) (1.782) (0.724) (0.900)
Tuesday (9/16) -5.120 *** b 0.328 b -2.938 *** a 0.386 a
(1.324) (1.687) (0.739) (0.888)
Post-AIG, pre-IOR (9/17-10/8) -4.712 *** -3.002 *** -2.067 *** b 0.321 b
(0.919) (0.969) (0.559) (0.791)
1 week pre-Lehman x %NPL -49.976 *** a 0.360 a 17.683 * 4.942
(17.394) (4.397) (9.821) (5.282)
Friday x %NPL -42.300 ** -17.150 15.009 6.436
(17.800) (18.111) (10.194) (5.892)
Monday x %NPL -71.045 *** a 0.494 a 29.302 *** b -0.194 b
(23.368) (5.869) (11.338) (5.949)
Tuesday x %NPL -51.931 *** a 0.589 a 22.341 ** c 2.237 c
(19.379) (4.784) (10.622) (5.776)
Post-AIG, pre-IOR x %NPL -56.501 *** a 1.954 a 10.747 1.148
(17.723) (3.852) (9.047) (4.677)
Bank Fixed Effects No No No No
N 23,378 31,948 27,696 28,357
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Table V 
Impact of the Lehman Event on Spreads 
The sample for borrowers consists of 21,003 observations from 360 borrowers from April 1, 2008 to February 28, 2009.  The sample for lenders consists of 26,700 observations 
from 376 lenders from April 1, 2008 to February 28, 2009.  We divide the samples into terciles, where Large is the top tercile of assets and Small is the bottom tercile of assets.  
The dependent variable is Spread to Target.  All specifications control for amount borrowed (lent) as a percent of bank assets.  Specifications (3), (4), (7), and (8) include controls 
for the interaction of Assets and the time periods.  Bank characteristics are measured as of the Call Report as of December 2007.  Standard errors are clustered at the bank level.  
***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.  a, b, and c indicate the difference between the coefficients of the Large and Small banks 
is statistically significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
Borrowers Lenders
Large Small Large Small Large Small Large Small
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
1 week pre-Lehman (9/5-9/11) -0.017 ** -0.021 0.029 0.093 -0.026 *** -0.014 * -0.005 -0.052
(0.007) (0.024) (0.041) (0.500) (0.010) (0.008) (0.047) (0.050)
Friday (9/12) 0.079 *** 0.104 *** -0.008 c 0.360 * c 0.072 *** 0.062 *** 0.080 0.022
(0.010) (0.035) (0.067) (0.195) (0.013) (0.012) (0.069) (0.080)
Monday (9/15) 0.154 a 0.943 *** a 0.699 0.049 0.144 0.322 *** -0.478 0.431
(0.114) (0.243) (0.747) (2.340) (0.122) (0.119) (0.574) (0.833)
Tuesday (9/16) -0.098 * b 0.355 * b 0.175 0.545 -0.242 *** -0.297 *** -1.357 *** a 0.400 a
(0.058) (0.203) (0.516) (1.244) (0.086) (0.066) (0.420) (0.381)
Post-AIG, pre-IOR (9/17-10/8) -0.322 *** a 0.146 a 0.254 1.537 -0.427 *** -0.501 *** -1.358 *** a 0.043 a
(0.043) (0.091) (0.336) (0.954) (0.045) (0.068) (0.174) (0.392)
1 week pre-Lehman x %NPL 0.953 -0.298 -0.950 -0.017
(1.646) (0.825) (0.720) (0.230)
Friday x %NPL 3.569 c -3.732 c -0.538 -0.050
(3.032) (2.323) (0.592) (0.410)
Monday x %NPL 31.407 * 3.193 -1.447 2.554
(18.405) (7.393) (6.022) (5.379)
Tuesday x %NPL -17.575 * -19.354 ** 7.994 ** c 0.371 c
(9.397) (8.324) (3.839) (2.538)
Post-AIG, pre-IOR x %NPL 10.114 a -10.845 *** a -0.027 -3.714
(6.911) (3.327) (1.770) (2.910)
Fixed Effects Borrower Borrower Borrower Borrower Lender Lender Lender Lender
N 13,887 1,951 13,887 1,951 10,469 9,233 10,469 9,233
Adjusted-R2 0.50 0.49 0.52 0.51 0.40 0.51 0.41 0.52
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Table VI 
Impact of the Lehman Event on Amount Borrowed / Lent 
The sample for borrowers consists of 21,003 observations from 360 borrowers from April 1, 2008 to February 28, 2009.  The sample for lenders consists of 26,700 observations 
from 376 lenders from April 1, 2008 to February 28, 2009.  We divide the samples into terciles, where Large is the top tercile of assets and Small is the bottom tercile of assets.  
The dependent variable is Amount.  Specifications (3), (4), (7), and (8) include controls for the interaction of Assets and the time periods.  Bank characteristics are measured as of 
the Call Report as of December 2007.  Standard errors are clustered at the bank level.  ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.  a, 
b, and c indicate the difference between the coefficients of the Large and Small banks is statistically significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
Borrowers Lenders
Large Small Large Small Large Small Large Small
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
1 week pre-Lehman (9/5-9/11) -0.047 0.057 0.368 -0.317 0.079 -0.028 0.573 * b -0.666 * b
(0.074) (0.065) (0.305) (0.549) (0.074) (0.055) (0.344) (0.382)
Friday (9/12) -0.084 0.119 -0.166 c -1.283 *** c 0.134 -0.006 0.359 -0.364
(0.099) (0.085) (0.501) (0.425) (0.118) (0.073) (0.511) (0.589)
Monday (9/15) -0.289 ** -0.060 -0.491 -1.081 ** -0.002 -0.194 ** 0.280 -0.339
(0.117) (0.119) (0.585) (0.436) (0.103) (0.080) (0.529) (0.519)
Tuesday (9/16) -0.079 -0.196 0.117 0.421 -0.070 -0.199 ** 0.411 -0.507
(0.096) (0.130) (0.424) (0.575) (0.102) (0.082) (0.523) (0.550)
Post-AIG, pre-IOR (9/17-10/8) -0.267 *** -0.082 -0.300 0.635 -0.084 -0.177 *** 0.020 -0.468
(0.084) (0.092) (0.410) (1.275) (0.073) (0.062) (0.373) (0.395)
1 week pre-Lehman x %NPL -49.652 *** a -7.077 a 7.881 * b -2.307 b
(13.668) (4.812) (4.100) (1.647)
Friday x %NPL -31.274 -7.946 * 6.189 -4.328
(22.139) (4.127) (6.602) (2.683)
Monday x %NPL -49.159 *** c -12.037 *** c 0.397 -5.779 *
(19.010) (2.695) (5.463) (3.172)
Tuesday x %NPL -35.325 -6.169 4.378 -4.511
(25.199) (11.294) (5.699) (2.946)
Post-AIG, pre-IOR x %NPL -46.921 *** a -1.719 a 0.407 -4.041
(14.919) (6.967) (4.188) (2.777)
Fixed Effects Borrower Borrower Borrower Borrower Lender Lender Lender Lender
N 13,887 1,951 13,887 1,951 10,469 9,233 10,469 9,233
Adjusted-R2 0.81 0.78 0.82 0.78 0.83 0.94 0.84 0.94
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Table VII 
Impact of the Lehman Event on Number of Counterparties 
Note: The sample for borrowers consists of 21,003 observations from 360 borrowers from April 1, 2008 to February 28, 2009.  The sample for lenders consists of 26,700 
observations from 376 lenders from April 1, 2008 to February 28, 2009.  We divide the samples into terciles, where Large is the top tercile of assets and Small is the bottom tercile 
of assets.  The dependent variable is Counterparties.  All specifications control for amount borrowed (lent) as a percent of bank assets.  Specifications (3), (4), (7), and (8) include 
controls for the interaction of Assets and the time periods.  Bank characteristics are measured as of the Call Report as of December 2007.  Standard errors are clustered at the bank 
level.  ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.  a, b, and c indicate the difference between the coefficients of the Large and Small 
banks is statistically significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
Borrowers Lenders
Large Small Large Small Large Small Large Small
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
1 week pre-Lehman (9/5-9/11) 0.005 0.030 0.060 -0.111 0.016 0.005 0.052 -0.229
(0.036) (0.024) (0.186) (0.258) (0.039) (0.032) (0.194) (0.321)
Friday (9/12) -0.005 0.041 0.004 -0.220 0.069 0.032 -0.101 -0.130
(0.051) (0.043) (0.211) (0.208) (0.057) (0.028) (0.297) (0.211)
Monday (9/15) -0.129 ** a 0.038 a 0.332 -0.244 -0.024 -0.042 0.273 -0.159
(0.052) (0.037) (0.260) (0.274) (0.057) (0.041) (0.252) (0.230)
Tuesday (9/16) -0.078 b 0.151 ** b 0.708 ** a -0.481 * a -0.034 -0.051 -0.131 -0.222
(0.054) (0.076) (0.292) (0.291) (0.072) (0.042) (0.376) (0.355)
Post-AIG, pre-IOR (9/17-10/8) -0.060 c 0.067 c 0.538 *** c -0.502 c -0.122 *** -0.035 -0.122 -0.295
(0.040) (0.056) (0.188) (0.523) (0.040) (0.041) (0.203) (0.372)
1 week pre-Lehman x %NPL -20.991 *** a -1.130 a 5.224 ** b -0.007 b
(6.547) (1.249) (2.432) (0.780)
Friday x %NPL -12.604 -4.871 5.255 c -0.504 c
(10.730) (3.517) (3.353) (0.724)
Monday x %NPL -16.927 ** b -0.964 b 7.800 *** b -0.688 b
(7.678) (1.729) (2.938) (1.586)
Tuesday x %NPL -22.845 ** -3.876 3.213 -1.099
(11.065) (3.453) (4.364) (1.856)
Post-AIG, pre-IOR x %NPL -22.105 ** b 0.809 b 0.228 -0.088
(9.567) (1.874) (2.592) (0.974)
Fixed Effects Borrower Borrower Borrower Borrower Lender Lender Lender Lender
N 13,887 1,951 13,887 1,951 10,469 9,233 10,469 9,233
Adjusted-R2 0.87 0.62 0.89 0.62 0.85 0.92 0.85 0.92
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Table VIII 
Discount Window Borrowing 
The sample consists of 64,583 observations from 360 borrowers from April 1, 2008 to February 28, 2009. The dependent 
variable is Access (Discount Window).   Specifications (2) through (5) include controls for the interaction of Assets and the time 
period dummies.  Bank characteristics are measured as of the Call Report as of December 2007.  Standard errors are clustered at 
the bank level.  ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
  
Percent %NPL RoA
Borrowers (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
1 week pre-Lehman (9/5-9/11) 1.6 0.253 ** -1.006 *** -0.922 * -0.970 *** -0.885 *
(0.116) (0.290) (0.479) (0.285) (0.461)
Friday (9/12) 1.7 0.266  -1.212 *** -1.156 ** -1.085 *** -1.035 **
(0.163) (0.384) (0.556) (0.330) (0.507)
Monday (9/15) 3.9 0.640 *** -0.175  -0.051  -0.155  -0.037  
(0.139) (0.337) (0.546) (0.333) (0.526)
Tuesday (9/16) 1.7 0.264  -0.724 ** -0.665  -0.597 * -0.543  
(0.180) (0.287) (0.490) (0.335) (0.511)
Post-AIG, pre-IOR (9/17-10/8) 2.3 0.387 *** -0.115  -0.025  -0.082  -0.013  
(0.096) (0.373) (0.560) (0.323) (0.494)
1 week pre-Lehman x Characteristic -2.970  -2.666  -25.286  -26.473  
(7.859) (7.768) (16.795) (16.175)
Friday x Characteristic 3.473  3.756  -34.010  -33.989  
(5.280) (5.240) (24.860) (24.646)
Monday x Characteristic -4.312  -4.294  -50.817 ** -52.650 **
(9.773) (9.803) (24.612) (24.136)
Tuesday x Characteristic 7.767 * 7.921 * -75.161 *** -75.552 ***
(4.315) (4.328) (27.737) (27.432)
Post-AIG, pre-IOR x Characteristic 1.546  1.562  -43.624 ** -45.363 ***
(3.762) (3.815) (17.305) (16.914)
Previous Fed Funds 0.068  0.068  
Amount (0.070) (0.069)
Previous Fed Funds 0.086  0.118  
Spread (0.209) (0.209)
Same Day Fed Funds -0.071  -0.072  
Amount (0.051) (0.052)
Same Day Fed Funds 0.238  0.250  
Access Dummy (0.186) (0.186)
Borrower Fixed Effects No No No No No
N 64,583 64,583 64,583 64,583 64,583
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Table IX 
Impact of Lehman Event on Spread, Amount and Counterparties for Borrowers,  
Split By Demand Proxies 
The sample consists of 21,003 observations from 360 borrowers from April 1, 2008 to February 28, 2009.  We divide the samples 
into terciles where banks in the bottom tercile have %Repo of less than 0.00176 and banks in the top tercile have %Repo greater 
than or equal to 0.03721.  The dependent variables are Spread to Target,  Amount, and Counterparties.  All specifications include 
controls for the interaction of Assets and the time period dummies.  Specifications (1), (2), (5), and (6) include controls for 
amount borrowed as a percent of bank assets.  Bank characteristics are measured as of the Call Report as of December 2007.  
Standard errors are clustered at the bank level.  ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, 
respectively.  a, b, and c indicate the difference between the coefficients of the Large and Small banks is statistically significant at 
the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
 
 
Spread to Target Amount Counterparties
< 0.0  ≥ 0.04 < 0.0  ≥ 0.04 < 0.0  ≥ 0.04
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1 week pre-Lehman (9/5-9/11) 0.015 -0.004 -1.021 *** a 0.149 a -0.322 *** a 0.241 a
(0.131) (0.033) (0.364) (0.262) (0.077) (0.170)
Friday (9/12) 0.135 0.018 -0.554 -0.489 -0.225 * b 0.189 b
(0.116) (0.059) (0.370) (0.484) (0.124) (0.135)
Monday (9/15) -0.498 0.229 -1.006 ** -0.319 -0.569 ** a 0.438 ** a
(1.146) (0.548) (0.474) (0.536) (0.258) (0.207)
Tuesday (9/16) 1.225 * c -0.081 c -0.413 0.240 0.245 0.700 ***
(0.648) (0.387) (0.516) (0.397) (0.272) (0.234)
Post-AIG, pre-IOR (9/17-10/8) 1.324 *** a 0.098 a -0.900 * -0.647 ** -0.168 a 0.615 *** a
(0.165) (0.277) (0.503) (0.280) (0.170) (0.159)
1 week pre-Lehman x %NPL -0.078 1.489 -4.030 b -35.433 ** b -0.901 -8.516
(1.416) (1.239) (6.195) (14.462) (1.558) (7.377)
Friday x %NPL -4.313 * 3.065 -23.585 * -55.830 * -6.975 ** -11.256
(2.382) (3.848) (12.304) (31.591) (3.447) (8.868)
Monday x %NPL 1.230 b 56.991 ** b -27.732 * -19.842 0.699 5.921
(9.540) (25.808) (14.304) (25.536) (2.526) (9.915)
Tuesday x %NPL -15.961 ** -2.873 -18.191 -34.729 ** -10.814 ** -6.150
(7.541) (6.291) (17.008) (14.169) (5.106) (11.703)
Post-AIG, pre-IOR x %NPL -8.171 * b 9.691 b 2.944 b -23.874 * b -1.927 -8.148
(4.730) (7.600) (5.530) (12.373) (1.630) (10.662)
Borrower Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 2,799 9,927 2,799 9,927 2,799 9,927
Adjusted R2 0.58 0.50 0.85 0.87 0.89 0.93
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Table X 
Impact of Lehman Event on Spread, Amount and Counterparties for Lenders,  
Split By Demand Proxies 
The sample consists of 26,700 observations from 376 lenders from April 1, 2008 to February 28, 2009.  We divide the sample 
into terciles, where banks in the bottom tercile have %Repo equal to zero and banks in the top tercile have %Repo greater than or 
equal to 0.02502.  The dependent variables are Spread to Target, Amount, and Counterparties.  All specifications include 
controls for the interaction of Assets and the time period dummies.  Specifications (1), (2), (5), and (6) include controls for 
amount lent as a percent of bank assets.  Bank characteristics are measured as of the Call Report as of December 2007.  Standard 
errors are clustered at the bank level.  ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.  
a, b, and c indicate the difference between the coefficients of the Large and Small banks is statistically significant at the 1%, 5%, 
and 10% level, respectively. 
 
  
Spread to Target Amount Counterparties
≤ 0.0  ≥ 0.03 ≤ 0.0  ≥ 0.03 ≤ 0.0  ≥ 0.03
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1 week pre-Lehman (9/5-9/11) 0.002 0.040 -0.292 c 0.279 c -0.090 -0.008
(0.029) (0.040) (0.218) (0.264) (0.144) (0.151)
Friday (9/12) 0.071 ** 0.084 * -0.120 0.081 -0.104 -0.070
(0.036) (0.050) (0.307) (0.325) (0.143) (0.175)
Monday (9/15) 1.064 *** a -0.673 a -0.008 -0.289 0.093 0.079
(0.359) (0.460) (0.287) (0.388) (0.120) (0.165)
Tuesday (9/16) 0.224 a -1.169 *** a -0.119 -0.073 0.049 -0.119
(0.207) (0.357) (0.378) (0.405) (0.212) (0.277)
Post-AIG, pre-IOR (9/17-10/8) -0.080 a -1.399 *** a -0.163 -0.269 0.076 -0.026
(0.209) (0.145) (0.262) (0.340) (0.203) (0.169)
1 week pre-Lehman x %NPL 0.066 -1.441 -3.616 ** a 14.509 ** a -0.130 b 8.815 ** b
(0.147) (1.119) (1.570) (6.613) (0.494) (3.880)
Friday x %NPL -0.256 -0.317 -3.825 * 9.755 -0.555 6.197
(0.310) (0.894) (2.203) (8.199) (0.651) (4.471)
Monday x %NPL -1.815 -0.856 -2.912 11.378 -0.103 b 11.029 ** b
(2.971) (9.420) (2.905) (9.846) (0.824) (4.549)
Tuesday x %NPL -2.436 c 8.943 c -3.405 ** b 13.890 b -0.501 3.841
(1.858) (5.553) (1.511) (8.679) (0.745) (6.485)
Post-AIG, pre-IOR x %NPL -3.006 ** 1.871 -4.935 *** c 7.186 c -0.755 -1.596
(1.235) (2.786) (1.491) (7.061) (0.690) (3.943)
Lender Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 12,211 8,967 12,211 8,967 12,211 8,967
Adjusted R2 0.50 0.47 0.91 0.88 0.90 0.87
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Appendix: The Furfine Algorithm 
We identify fed funds loans using an algorithm similar to the one proposed by Furfine 
(1999). This technique has been used to identify uncollateralized loans in the U.S. Fedwire 
Funds Service (Fedwire) in Furfine (2001, 2002), Demiralp, Preslopsky, and Whitesell (2004), 
Ashcraft and Bleakley (2006), Ashcraft and Duffie (2007), Bech and Atalay (2008), and 
Bartolini, Hilton, and McAndrews (2010), among others. Modified versions of this methodology 
are also employed by Millard and Polenghi (2004) and Acharya and Merrouche (2010) to 
identify overnight lending activity in the U.K. CHAPS Sterling and by Hendry and Kamhi 
(2007) in Canada’s Large Value Transfer System (LVTS). 
The algorithm identifies fed funds loans from payments as follows: 
• Step 1: Screen out settlement institutions from pool of transactions transferred over 
Fedwire. 
 
The algorithm excludes transactions for which the sending institution is not involved in 
fed funds activity such as transfers originating from the Clearing House Interbank 
Payments System (CHIPS, a private and large-value U.S. dollar payments system owned 
and operated by the Clearing House Payments Company), the Continuous Linked 
Settlement (CLS, a payment-versus-payment settlement system that settles foreign 
exchange transactions), or the Depository Trust Company (DTC, a securities settlement 
system). 
 
• Step 2: Identify overnight loans. 
 
We identify all transfers from one institution to another in amounts equal to or greater 
than $1 million and ending in five zeros when there is a payment of a slightly higher 
amount in the opposite direction on the following day. The difference between the two 
payments is interpreted as the interest rate on the loan.  These transfers are selected 
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because federal funds loans are usually made in round lots of over $1 million (Stigum 
and Crescenzi (2007), Furfine (1999)).   
 
Next, we refine this set of potential fed funds loans by limiting the range of possible loan 
rates. “Reasonable” interest rates for uncollateralized loans may vary daily depending on 
market conditions. To take the variation in rates into account, we narrow the pool of 
overnight loans to include only loans with (positive) rates within a window of 50 basis 
points below the minimum brokered fed funds rate (low) and 50 basis points above the 
maximum brokered fed funds rate (high) published by the Markets Group of the Federal 
Reserve Bank of New York from a daily survey of the four largest federal funds 
brokers.25  
 
• Step 3: Identify a unique rate per fed funds loan. 
 
When on the following day multiple repayments match one outgoing payment, the 
algorithm identifies the median rate as the rate of the loan. 
 
• Step 4: Separate fed funds from Eurodollar activity. 
 
The U.S. market for unsecured loans consists of federal funds and Eurodollar26 trades. An 
important difference between these two types of trades is that while fed funds can be 
settled directly between borrower and lender, Eurodollars require an intermediary or 
correspondent bank to complete the transfer (McAndrews (2009)). Step 4 incorporates 
the customer code that a sending bank enters on the payment message indicating the 
payment is made on behalf of a customer as a proxy for a Eurodollar loan to distinguish 
whether an overnight loan is fed funds or Eurodollar.27  
 
 
As noted by Furfine (1999) and Bech and Atalay (2008), among others, this methodology 
presents some weaknesses. First, only fed funds loans settled through Fedwire are identified. 
However, fed funds loans settle almost exclusively on Fedwire (McAndrews (2009)). Second, 
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term fed funds loans are not included. The term funds market is considerably smaller than the 
overnight market and the amount of term fed funds outstanding is probably on the order of one-
tenth (Meulendyke (1998)) to one-half (Kuo, Skeie, and Vickery (2010)) of the amount of 
overnight funds arranged on a given day. Third, loans made on behalf of client nonfinancial 
firms and client banks may be misattributed to the correspondent bank.28 Similarly, transfers 
between banks that pay an opportunity cost of capital for specific purposes such as settlement 
will be included as fed funds loans. However, as Furfine (1999) pointed out, correspondent 
lending mainly represents loans made by very small institutions with little or no direct contact 
with major financial markets. Fourth, rates outside the specified window are missed. Increasing 
the size of the window is unlikely to add additional fed funds transactions (Furfine (1999)). Fifth, 
other overnight loans settled through Fedwire, such as Eurodollars or tri-party repos, could be 
misidentified as fed funds. Refinements of the algorithm such as the use of the customer code as 
a proxy for Eurodollar loans lessen the relevance of this concern.  
When comparing the loans calculated from the Furfine algorithm to quarter end overnight 
fed funds loans outstanding reported on Y-9C filings, there are significant differences in levels 
between the algorithm-estimated amount and the actual balance on the Y-9C. On average the 
algorithm underestimates outstanding loans for borrowers, which is consistent with the existence 
of loans made with correspondent banks (which do not go through Fedwire and thus are not 
measured). We do not find systematic biases between fed funds loans measured by the algorithm 
and those reported on banks’ Y-9C based on bank characteristics such as assets, the percentage 
of NPLs, or the percentage of repo financing.  
Of particular relevance to the findings in this paper, the difference between fed funds 
loans measured by the algorithm and those reported on banks’ Y-9C calculated as of the second 
quarter of 2008 and the third quarter of 2008 is also not statistically significantly associated with 
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bank characteristics such as assets, the percentage of NPLs, or the percentage of repo financing. 
In sum, while the algorithm seems to miss some fed funds loans, especially those that do not go 
through Fedwire, we do not find any systematic bias between banks or over time from missing 
observations (or transactions misclassified as fed funds) that would bias the results in the paper.  
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Internet Appendix for “Stressed, not Frozen: The Federal Funds Market in the Financial 
Crisis”* 
 
 
Figure IA.1.  Daily amount of federal funds transactions ($ billions).  The figure shows the aggregate daily amount borrowed 
in the fed funds market in U.S. $ billions from January 2, 2007 to August 28, 2009.  The arrows indicate the following dates: i) 
August 9, 2007 – BNP Paribas tells investors that they cannot value assets in two funds, ii) March 16, 2008 – JP Morgan 
announces that it will acquire Bear Stearns for $2 a share, iii) September 15, 2008 – Lehman Brothers files for bankruptcy after 
failing to find a merger partner, and iv) October 9, 2008 – First day of the first maintenance period after the Federal Reserve’s  
announcement that it will pay interest on required reserve balances and on excess balances held by or on behalf of depository 
institutions. 
 
 
                                                     
* Afonso, Gara, Anna Kovner, and Antoinette Schoar, 2011, Internet Appendix for “Stressed, not Frozen: The 
Federal Funds Market in the Financial Crisis,” Journal of Finance [vol #], [pages], 
http://www.afajof.org/supplements.asp. Please note: Wiley-Blackwell is not responsible for the content or 
functionality of any supporting information supplied by the authors. Any queries (other than missing material) 
should be directed to the authors of the article. 
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Figure IA.2: Daily number of borrowers and lenders.  The figure shows the daily number of borrowers and lenders in the fed 
funds market from January 2, 2007 to August 28, 2009.  The arrows indicate the following dates: i) August 9, 2007 – BNP 
Paribas tells investors that they cannot value assets in two funds, ii) March 16, 2008 – JP Morgan announces that it will acquire 
Bear Stearns for $2 a share, iii) September 15, 2008 – Lehman Brothers files for bankruptcy after failing to find a merger partner, 
and iv) October 9, 2008 – First day of the first maintenance period after the Federal Reserve’s  announcement that it will pay 
interest on required reserve balances and on excess balances held by or on behalf of depository institutions. 
 
 
 
Figure IA.3.  Daily fed funds rates.  The figure shows the weighted average daily fed funds rate as well as the daily fed funds 
rate in the 25th and 75th percentiles of borrowers from January 2, 2007 to August 28, 2009.  The arrows indicate the following 
dates: i) August 9, 2007 – BNP Paribas tells investors that they cannot value assets in two funds, ii) March 16, 2008 – JP Morgan 
announces that it will acquire Bear Stearns for $2 a share, iii) September 15, 2008 – Lehman Brothers files for bankruptcy after 
failing to find a merger partner, and iv) October 9, 2008 – First day of the first maintenance period after the Federal Reserve’s  
announcement that it will pay interest on required reserve balances and on excess balances held by or on behalf of depository 
institutions.  The following events are not pictured:  i) September 18, 2007 – FOMC lowers target overnight federal funds rate 50 
basis points to 4.75%, ii) October 31, 2007 – FOMC lowers target rate to 4.50%, iii) December 11, 2007 – FOMC lowers target 
rate to 4.25%, iv) January 22, 2008 – FOMC lowers target rate to 3.50%, v) January 30, 2008 – FOMC lowers target rate to 
3.00%, vi) March 18, 2008 – FOMC lowers target rate to 2.25%, vii) April 30, 2008 – FOMC lowers target rate to 2.00%, viii) 
October 8, 2008 – FOMC lowers target rate to 1.50%, ix) October 29, 2008 – FOMC lowers target rate to 1.00%, and x) 
December 16, 2008 – FOMC lowers target rate to a band between 0 and 25 basis points. 
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Table IA.I 
Dependent Variables, Borrowers (Full) 
The sample used in column (1) consists of 81,576 observations from 360 borrowers from April 1, 2008 to February 28, 2009, where observations have been filled in with 0’s on 
days banks do not borrow.  The sample used in columns (2) to (7) consists of 21,003 observations from 360 borrowers from April 1, 2008 to February 28, 2009, where only banks 
that borrow are present.  Access is an indicator equal to one if the bank borrowed on that day.  Spread to Target is the weighted average spread between banks’ fed funds loans and 
the target federal funds rate on that day. Amount is the logarithm of the amount borrowed in the fed funds market on that day (in U.S. $ millions).  Counterparties is the logarithm 
of the number of counterparties each bank has on that day.  Standard errors are clustered at the bank level.  ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
level, respectively. 
 
Access Spread to Target Amount Counterparties
Probit OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
2 weeks pre-Lehman (8/29-9/4) -0.059 * 0.008  0.008  -0.051  -0.077  0.029  -0.004  
(0.034) (0.008) (0.006) (0.101) (0.056) (0.053) (0.035)
1 week pre-Lehman (9/5-9/11) -0.095 *** -0.022 *** -0.017 ** 0.016  -0.033  0.059  0.008  
(0.037) (0.008) (0.007) (0.104) (0.055) (0.056) (0.037)
Friday (9/12) -0.063  0.067 *** 0.076 *** -0.059  -0.076  0.030  0.002  
(0.047) (0.011) (0.008) (0.152) (0.082) (0.073) (0.049)
Monday (9/15) -0.080 * 0.242 *** 0.253 *** 0.010  -0.190 ** -0.029  -0.122 **
(0.046) (0.087) (0.087) (0.150) (0.093) (0.075) (0.053)
Tuesday (9/16) -0.097 ** -0.021  -0.013  0.070  -0.096  0.035  -0.062  
(0.047) (0.053) (0.049) (0.141) (0.076) (0.073) (0.050)
Post-AIG, pre-IOR (9/17-10/8) -0.148 *** -0.224 *** -0.229 *** -0.050  -0.249 *** 0.035  -0.096 **
(0.032) (0.037) (0.036) (0.094) (0.063) (0.050) (0.038)
Post-IOR, pre-CPP (10/9-10/13) -0.300 *** -0.440 *** -0.388 *** 0.297 * -0.319 *** 0.145 * -0.182 ***
(0.048) (0.047) (0.043) (0.168) (0.093) (0.085) (0.054)
1 month post-CPP (10/14-11/10) -0.228 *** -0.515 *** -0.494 *** 0.152  -0.259 *** -0.018  -0.252 ***
(0.040) (0.028) (0.026) (0.115) (0.082) (0.064) (0.055)
2 months post-CPP (11/11-12/8) -0.289 *** -0.425 *** -0.395 *** 0.157  -0.368 *** -0.121  -0.407 ***
(0.046) (0.028) (0.025) (0.142) (0.096) (0.075) (0.068)
3 months post-CPP (12/9-1/5) -0.368 *** -0.073 *** -0.039 * 0.061  -0.548 *** -0.183 ** -0.509 ***
(0.048) (0.022) (0.021) (0.149) (0.125) (0.083) (0.084)
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Access Spread to Target Amount Counterparties
Probit OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
4 months post-CPP (1/6-2/2) -0.332 *** 0.206 *** 0.209 *** -0.110  -0.441 *** -0.169 ** -0.389 ***
(0.052) (0.015) (0.012) (0.157) (0.123) (0.077) (0.073)
5 months post-CPP (2/3-2/28) -0.381 *** 0.208 *** 0.229 *** 0.057  -0.540 *** -0.086  -0.422 ***
(0.054) (0.014) (0.011) (0.172) (0.125) (0.085) (0.074)
Borrower Fixed Effects No No Yes No Yes No Yes
N 81,576 21,003 21,003 21,003 21,003 21,003 21,003
Adjusted-R2 0.27 0.51 0.00 0.86 0.00 0.83
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Table IA.II 
Dependent Variables, Lenders (Full) 
The sample used in column (1) consists of 84,853 observations from 376 lenders from April 1, 2008 to February 28, 2009, where observations have been filled in with 0’s on days 
banks do not lend.  The sample used in columns (2) to (7) consists of 26,700 observations from 376 lenders from April 1, 2008 to February 28, 2009, where only banks that lend 
are present.  Spread to Target is the weighted average spread between the banks’ fed funds loans and the target federal funds rate on that day. Amount is the logarithm of the 
amount lent in the fed funds market on that day (in U.S. $ millions).  Counterparties is the logarithm of the number of counterparties each bank has on that day. Standard errors are 
clustered at the bank level.  ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
Access Spread to Target Amount Counterparties
Probit OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
2 weeks pre-Lehman (8/29-9/4) 0.070 ** -0.005  0.006  -0.029  0.023  -0.030  -0.005  
(0.032) (0.007) (0.006) (0.065) (0.042) (0.028) (0.019)
1 week pre-Lehman (9/5-9/11) 0.046  -0.024 *** -0.015 *** 0.017  0.030  -0.019  -0.002  
(0.033) (0.005) (0.005) (0.063) (0.041) (0.030) (0.022)
Friday (9/12) 0.066  0.054 *** 0.067 *** 0.002  0.035  0.011  0.040  
(0.046) (0.007) (0.007) (0.092) (0.060) (0.040) (0.028)
Monday (9/15) -0.086 * 0.178 ** 0.168 ** -0.016  -0.099 * -0.016  -0.064 **
(0.044) (0.072) (0.071) (0.091) (0.058) (0.043) (0.030)
Tuesday (9/16) -0.136 *** -0.303 *** -0.306 *** 0.052  -0.131 ** 0.042  -0.079 **
(0.044) (0.047) (0.045) (0.093) (0.056) (0.049) (0.036)
Post-AIG, pre-IOR (9/17-10/8) -0.160 *** -0.509 *** -0.507 *** 0.143 * -0.113 ** 0.000  -0.113 ***
(0.036) (0.034) (0.034) (0.074) (0.046) (0.037) (0.027)
Post-IOR, pre-CPP (10/9-10/13) -0.296 *** -0.523 *** -0.530 *** 0.261 * -0.066  0.007  -0.153 ***
(0.055) (0.040) (0.034) (0.134) (0.072) (0.060) (0.044)
1 month post-CPP (10/14-11/10) -0.497 *** -0.513 *** -0.560 *** 0.244 * -0.334 *** 0.041  -0.267 ***
(0.047) (0.027) (0.023) (0.127) (0.070) (0.060) (0.042)
2 months post-CPP (11/11-12/8) -0.715 *** -0.313 *** -0.400 *** 0.482 ** -0.460 *** 0.121  -0.418 ***
(0.058) (0.032) (0.025) (0.190) (0.110) (0.089) (0.065)
3 months post-CPP (12/9-1/5) -0.786 *** 0.066 ** -0.036  0.539 *** -0.551 *** 0.107  -0.512 ***
(0.060) (0.027) (0.022) (0.203) (0.117) (0.093) (0.073)
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Access Spread to Target Amount Counterparties
Probit OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
4 months post-CPP (1/6-2/2) -0.818 *** 0.301 *** 0.199 *** 0.777 *** -0.329 *** 0.284 *** -0.353 ***
(0.063) (0.019) (0.014) (0.211) (0.101) (0.100) (0.064)
5 months post-CPP (2/3-2/28) -0.777 *** 0.313 *** 0.229 *** 0.808 *** -0.178  0.309 *** -0.262 ***
(0.065) (0.015) (0.013) (0.201) (0.110) (0.098) (0.071)
Lender Fixed Effects No No Yes No Yes No Yes
N 84,853 26,700 26,700 26,700 26,700 26,700 26,700
Adjusted-R2 0.29 0.48 0.01 0.88 0.01 0.86
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Table IA.III 
Dependent Variables, Lenders with Full Sample (Full) 
The sample consists of 45,175 observations from 552 lenders from April 1, 2008 to February 28, 2009.  Spread to Target is the weighted average spread between banks’ fed funds 
loans and the target federal funds rate on that day. Amount is the logarithm of the amount lent in the fed funds market on that day (in millions of U.S. $).  Counterparties is the 
logarithm of the number of counterparties each bank has on that day. Standard errors are clustered at the bank level.  ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, 
and 10% level, respectively. 
 
Spread to Target Amount Counterparties
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
2 weeks pre-Lehman (8/29-9/4) -0.010 ** -0.002  -0.089 * -0.051  -0.047 ** -0.034 *
(0.005) (0.005) (0.052) (0.036) (0.022) (0.018)
1 week pre-Lehman (9/5-9/11) -0.029 *** -0.021 *** -0.055  -0.045  -0.040 * -0.029  
(0.004) (0.004) (0.052) (0.038) (0.024) (0.019)
Friday (9/12) 0.057 *** 0.071 *** -0.056  -0.049  -0.029  -0.013  
(0.007) (0.007) (0.079) (0.057) (0.033) (0.026)
Monday (9/15) 0.231 *** 0.225 *** 0.039  -0.093 * -0.023  -0.084 ***
(0.063) (0.063) (0.080) (0.048) (0.037) (0.028)
Tuesday (9/16) -0.163 *** -0.169 *** 0.112  -0.113 ** 0.047  -0.083 ***
(0.050) (0.048) (0.083) (0.051) (0.041) (0.031)
Post-AIG, pre-IOR (9/17-10/8) -0.408 *** -0.411 *** 0.141 ** -0.083 ** -0.021  -0.110 ***
(0.030) (0.029) (0.063) (0.040) (0.029) (0.023)
Post-IOR, pre-CPP (10/9-10/13) -0.459 *** -0.465 *** 0.279 *** -0.048  0.006  -0.143 ***
(0.038) (0.036) (0.108) (0.058) (0.045) (0.034)
1 month post-CPP (10/14-11/10) -0.548 *** -0.582 *** 0.285 *** -0.310 *** 0.016  -0.250 ***
(0.019) (0.017) (0.103) (0.062) (0.044) (0.033)
2 months post-CPP (11/11-12/8) -0.378 *** -0.446 *** 0.493 *** -0.512 *** 0.065  -0.410 ***
(0.024) (0.020) (0.155) (0.097) (0.068) (0.050)
3 months post-CPP (12/9-1/5) 0.013  -0.069 *** 0.560 *** -0.615 *** 0.034  -0.550 ***
(0.021) (0.018) (0.167) (0.099) (0.071) (0.054)
4 months post-CPP (1/6-2/2) 0.274 *** 0.191 *** 0.764 *** -0.427 *** 0.172 ** -0.427 ***
(0.014) (0.013) (0.174) (0.100) (0.077) (0.054)
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Spread to Target Amount Counterparties
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
5 months post-CPP (2/3-2/28) 0.297 *** 0.225 *** 0.757 *** -0.261 *** 0.176 ** -0.343 ***
(0.011) (0.010) (0.161) (0.095) (0.071) (0.052)
Lender Fixed Effects No Yes No Yes No Yes
N 45,175 45,175 45,175 45,175 45,175 45,175
Adjusted-R2 0.24 0.40 0.01 0.87 0.00 0.82
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Table IA.IV 
Impact of Lehman Event on Access (Full) 
The sample for borrowers consists of 81,576 observations from 360 borrowers from April 1, 2008 to February 28, 2009.  The 
sample for lenders consists of 84,853 observations from 376 lenders from April 1, 2008 to February 28, 2009.  We divide the 
samples into terciles, where Large is the top tercile of assets and Small is the bottom tercile of assets.  The dependent variable is 
Access, an indicator variable equal to one if the bank borrowed / lent federal funds on that day.  Assets is the logarithm of bank 
assets (in U.S. $ millions).  %NPL is the amount of nonperforming loans divided by the amount of total loans.  Bank 
characteristics are measured as of the Call Report as of December 2007.  Standard errors are clustered at the bank level.  ***, **, 
and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.  a, b, and c indicate the difference between the 
coefficients of the Large and Small banks is statistically significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
 
Borrowers  Lenders
Large Small Large Small
(1) (2) (3) (4)
2 weeks pre-Lehman (8/29-9/4) -3.586 *** c -0.995 c -2.025 *** b 0.174 b
(0.937) (1.104) (0.642) (0.840)
1 week pre-Lehman (9/5-9/11) -4.102 *** b -1.070 b -1.800 *** -0.195
(0.976) (1.165) (0.614) (0.829)
Friday (9/12) -3.888 *** -2.352 -1.764 ** b 0.566 b
(1.101) (2.245) (0.739) (0.890)
Monday (9/15) -6.038 *** b -1.071 b -2.349 *** b 0.347 b
(1.705) (1.782) (0.724) (0.900)
Tuesday (9/16) -5.120 *** b 0.328 b -2.938 *** a 0.386 a
(1.324) (1.687) (0.739) (0.888)
Post-AIG, pre-IOR (9/17-10/8) -4.712 *** -3.002 *** -2.067 *** b 0.321 b
(0.919) (0.969) (0.559) (0.791)
Post-IOR, pre-CPP (10/9-10/13) -5.378 *** -4.703 *** -2.162 *** c 0.022 c
(1.141) (1.364) (0.662) (0.900)
1 month post-CPP (10/14-11/10) -5.116 *** b -2.413 ** b -3.247 *** b -0.715 b
(0.900) (0.995) (0.558) (0.909)
2 months post-CPP (11/11-12/8) -5.275 *** c -2.709 ** c -3.991 *** a -0.862 a
(0.780) (1.118) (0.650) (0.996)
3 months post-CPP (12/9-1/5) -4.285 *** c -2.326 ** c -4.662 *** a -0.686 a
(0.703) (0.932) (0.673) (1.018)
4 months post-CPP (1/6-2/2) -4.101 *** -2.208 -5.021 *** a -0.508 a
(0.722) (1.448) (0.762) (1.061)
5 months post-CPP (2/3-2/28) -4.895 *** a -0.751 a -4.118 *** a -0.544 a
(0.819) (1.221) (0.768) (1.062)
2 weeks pre-Lehman x %NPL -43.195 ** a 2.249 a 15.485 3.750
(17.005) (4.450) (9.740) (5.306)
1 week pre-Lehman x %NPL -49.976 *** a 0.360 a 17.683 * 4.942
(17.394) (4.397) (9.821) (5.282)
Friday x %NPL -42.300 ** -17.150 15.009 6.436
(17.800) (18.111) (10.194) (5.892)
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Borrowers  Lenders
Large Small Large Small
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Monday x %NPL -71.045 *** a 0.494 a 29.302 *** b -0.194 b
(23.368) (5.869) (11.338) (5.949)
Tuesday x %NPL -51.931 *** a 0.589 a 22.341 ** c 2.237 c
(19.379) (4.784) (10.622) (5.776)
Post-AIG, pre-IOR x %NPL -56.501 *** a 1.954 a 10.747 1.148
(17.723) (3.852) (9.047) (4.677)
Post-IOR, pre-CPP x %NPL -57.972 *** a 3.032 a -1.624 3.443
(21.747) (4.626) (10.786) (5.787)
1 month post-CPP x %NPL -54.558 *** a 4.329 a 5.193 1.208
(17.184) (4.578) (8.838) (5.023)
2 months post-CPP x %NPL -29.299 ** b 3.411 b 4.562 0.339
(12.604) (4.835) (9.334) (5.556)
3 months post-CPP x %NPL -27.000 ** -3.579 0.555 1.573
(13.042) (7.688) (9.261) (5.652)
4 months post-CPP x %NPL -43.122 *** -16.259 -9.753 2.509
(15.793) (10.373) (11.626) (5.928)
5 months post-CPP x %NPL -49.114 *** -19.428 -10.575 3.246
(17.916) (11.971) (10.921) (5.781)
2 weeks pre-Lehman x Assets 0.406 *** 0.167 0.206 *** -0.038
(0.103) (0.182) (0.066) (0.159)
1 week pre-Lehman x Assets 0.464 *** 0.186 0.175 *** 0.024
(0.109) (0.190) (0.064) (0.158)
Friday x Assets 0.444 *** 0.403 0.176 ** -0.113
(0.121) (0.361) (0.077) (0.169)
Monday x Assets 0.714 *** 0.166 0.199 *** -0.086
(0.198) (0.292) (0.072) (0.172)
Tuesday x Assets 0.586 *** b -0.062 b 0.259 *** c -0.084 c
(0.150) (0.283) (0.075) (0.169)
Post-AIG, pre-IOR x Assets 0.530 *** 0.480 *** 0.196 *** c -0.094 c
(0.103) (0.159) (0.058) (0.148)
Post-IOR, pre-CPP x Assets 0.582 *** 0.671 *** 0.194 *** -0.065
(0.126) (0.215) (0.067) (0.169)
1 month post-CPP x Assets 0.560 *** 0.338 ** 0.281 *** 0.049
(0.101) (0.164) (0.058) (0.170)
2 months post-CPP x Assets 0.535 *** 0.385 ** 0.330 *** 0.046
(0.084) (0.185) (0.065) (0.187)
3 months post-CPP x Assets 0.415 *** 0.313 * 0.391 *** c -0.003 c
(0.074) (0.166) (0.069) (0.191)
4 months post-CPP x Assets 0.408 *** 0.336 0.438 *** b -0.051 b
(0.078) (0.238) (0.079) (0.199)
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Borrowers  Lenders
Large Small Large Small
(1) (2) (3) (4)
5 months post-CPP x Assets 0.494 *** c 0.091 c 0.357 *** c -0.050 c
(0.090) (0.208) (0.077) (0.199)
Bank Fixed Effects No No No No
N 23,378 31,948 27,696 28,357
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Table IA.V 
Impact of the Lehman Event on Spreads (Full) 
The sample for borrowers consists of 21,003 observations from 360 borrowers from April 1, 2008 to February 28, 2009.  The sample for lenders consists of 26,700 observations 
from 376 lenders from April 1, 2008 to February 28, 2009.  We divide the samples into terciles, where Large is the top tercile of assets and Small is the bottom tercile of assets.  
The dependent variable is Spread to Target – the weighted average spread between banks’ fed funds loans and the target federal funds rate on that day.  Assets is the logarithm of 
bank assets (in U.S. $ millions).  %NPL is total nonperforming loans divided by total loans.  Amount / Assets is amount borrowed (lent) as a percent of bank assets. Bank 
characteristics are measured as of the Call Report as of December 2007.  Standard errors are clustered at the bank level.  ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 
5%, and 10% level, respectively.  a, b, and c indicate the difference between the coefficients of the Large and Small banks is statistically significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, 
respectively. 
 
Borrowers Lenders
Large Small Large Small Large Small Large Small
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
2 weeks pre-Lehman (8/29-9/4) 0.006 -0.009 0.031 b -0.284 ** b -0.007 0.011 0.194 ** b -0.034 b
(0.006) (0.015) (0.041) (0.141) (0.013) (0.008) (0.089) (0.061)
1 week pre-Lehman (9/5-9/11) -0.017 ** -0.021 0.029 0.093 -0.026 *** -0.014 * -0.005 -0.052
(0.007) (0.024) (0.041) (0.500) (0.010) (0.008) (0.047) (0.050)
Friday (9/12) 0.079 *** 0.104 *** -0.008 c 0.360 * c 0.072 *** 0.062 *** 0.080 0.022
(0.010) (0.035) (0.067) (0.195) (0.013) (0.012) (0.069) (0.080)
Monday (9/15) 0.154 a 0.943 *** a 0.699 0.049 0.144 0.322 *** -0.478 0.431
(0.114) (0.243) (0.747) (2.340) (0.122) (0.119) (0.574) (0.833)
Tuesday (9/16) -0.098 * b 0.355 * b 0.175 0.545 -0.242 *** -0.297 *** -1.357 *** a 0.400 a
(0.058) (0.203) (0.516) (1.244) (0.086) (0.066) (0.420) (0.381)
Post-AIG, pre-IOR (9/17-10/8) -0.322 *** a 0.146 a 0.254 1.537 -0.427 *** -0.501 *** -1.358 *** a 0.043 a
(0.043) (0.091) (0.336) (0.954) (0.045) (0.068) (0.174) (0.392)
Post-IOR, pre-CPP (10/9-10/13) -0.483 *** -0.198 -0.065 3.727 -0.420 *** -0.526 *** -0.961 *** -0.158
(0.043) (0.186) (0.283) (7.433) (0.056) (0.057) (0.306) (0.454)
1 month post-CPP (10/14-11/10) -0.584 *** a -0.166 *** a 0.079 -0.280 -0.486 *** a -0.552 *** a -0.442 *** -0.150
(0.027) (0.041) (0.154) (0.396) (0.035) (0.042) (0.158) (0.290)
2 months post-CPP (11/11-12/8) -0.478 *** a -0.163 *** a 0.125 -0.385 -0.334 *** a -0.401 *** a -0.102 -0.069
(0.024) (0.052) (0.121) (0.484) (0.043) (0.041) (0.211) (0.298)
3 months post-CPP (12/9-1/5) -0.091 *** a 0.109 a 0.226 * 1.087 * -0.018 a -0.039 a 0.122 0.378
(0.024) (0.067) (0.133) (0.626) (0.038) (0.039) (0.180) (0.268)
4 months post-CPP (1/6-2/2) 0.180 *** a 0.278 *** a 0.288 *** 0.671 0.221 *** a 0.188 *** a 0.229 ** 0.431 *
(0.014) (0.047) (0.072) (0.435) (0.020) (0.031) (0.108) (0.225)
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Borrowers Lenders
Large Small Large Small Large Small Large Small
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
5 months post-CPP (2/3-2/28) 0.219 *** a 0.281 *** a 0.262 *** 0.737 * 0.259 *** a 0.207 *** a 0.265 *** 0.452 **
(0.014) (0.048) (0.069) (0.383) (0.019) (0.026) (0.097) (0.194)
2 weeks pre-Lehman x %NPL -2.271 c 0.736 c -0.079 -0.332
(1.478) (0.631) (0.467) (0.250)
1 week pre-Lehman x %NPL 0.953 -0.298 -0.950 -0.017
(1.646) (0.825) (0.720) (0.230)
Friday x %NPL 3.569 c -3.732 c -0.538 -0.050
(3.032) (2.323) (0.592) (0.410)
Monday x %NPL 31.407 * 3.193 -1.447 2.554
(18.405) (7.393) (6.022) (5.379)
Tuesday x %NPL -17.575 * -19.354 ** 7.994 ** c 0.371 c
(9.397) (8.324) (3.839) (2.538)
Post-AIG, pre-IOR x %NPL 10.114 a -10.845 *** a -0.027 -3.714
(6.911) (3.327) (1.770) (2.910)
Post-IOR, pre-CPP x %NPL 8.201 -6.036 -0.500 -4.888 *
(9.622) (4.601) (3.354) (2.765)
1 month post-CPP x %NPL 4.560 2.733 ** -2.293 -2.296
(4.671) (1.173) (2.148) (1.800)
2 months post-CPP x %NPL 6.581 * c -1.088 c 3.286 -1.329
(3.554) (1.651) (3.198) (1.570)
3 months post-CPP x %NPL 6.725 b -9.048 ** b 4.424 -1.504
(5.225) (4.508) (4.190) (1.312)
4 months post-CPP x %NPL 5.743 * 5.562 0.478 -0.946
(2.957) (4.885) (1.948) (1.230)
5 months post-CPP x %NPL 4.735 3.799 0.003 -1.337
(3.308) (6.935) (1.282) (1.156)
2 weeks pre-Lehman x Assets 0.000 c 0.045 * c -0.021 ** b 0.010 b
(0.004) (0.023) (0.010) (0.011)
1 week pre-Lehman x Assets -0.006 -0.017 -0.001 0.007
(0.004) (0.082) (0.005) (0.009)
Friday x Assets 0.005 -0.038 0.000 0.008
(0.009) (0.039) (0.007) (0.016)
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Borrowers Lenders
Large Small Large Small Large Small Large Small
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Monday x Assets -0.083 0.148 0.066 -0.027
(0.079) (0.390) (0.054) (0.162)
Tuesday x Assets -0.010 0.006 0.100 ** a -0.135 * a
(0.057) (0.209) (0.045) (0.072)
Post-AIG, pre-IOR x Assets -0.066 * -0.205 0.096 *** b -0.095 b
(0.037) (0.162) (0.018) (0.077)
Post-IOR, pre-CPP x Assets -0.049 -0.618 0.056 * -0.057
(0.031) (1.220) (0.030) (0.087)
1 month post-CPP x Assets -0.070 *** 0.010 -0.001 -0.071
(0.015) (0.066) (0.015) (0.057)
2 months post-CPP x Assets -0.065 *** 0.037 -0.025 -0.060
(0.012) (0.085) (0.019) (0.057)
3 months post-CPP x Assets -0.038 *** -0.146 -0.017 -0.076
(0.012) (0.099) (0.017) (0.051)
4 months post-CPP x Assets -0.016 ** -0.070 0.000 -0.044
(0.007) (0.075) (0.010) (0.043)
5 months post-CPP x Assets -0.009 -0.079 0.000 -0.043
(0.008) (0.065) (0.009) (0.037)
Amount / Assets 1.211 *** 0.298 1.181 *** c 0.278 c -0.135 -0.013 -0.027 -0.007
(0.442) (0.313) (0.438) (0.304) (0.147) (0.021) (0.144) (0.023)
Fixed Effects Borrower Borrower Borrower Borrower Lender Lender Lender Lender
N 13,887 1,951 13,887 1,951 10,469 9,233 10,469 9,233
Adjusted-R2 0.50 0.49 0.52 0.51 0.40 0.51 0.41 0.52
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Table IA.VI 
Impact of the Lehman Event on Amount Borrowed / Lent (Full) 
The sample for borrowers consists of 21,003 observations from 360 borrowers from April 1, 2008 to February 28, 2009.  The sample for lenders consists of 26,700 observations 
from 376 lenders from April 1, 2008 to February 28, 2009.  We divide the samples into terciles, where Large is the top tercile of assets and Small is the bottom tercile of assets.  
The dependent variable is Amount – the logarithm of the amount of a bank’s loans in the fed funds market on that day (in U.S. $ millions).  Assets is the logarithm of bank assets 
(in US $ millions).  %NPL is total nonperforming loans divided by total loans.  Bank characteristics are measured as of the Call Report as of December 2007.  Standard errors are 
clustered at the bank level.  ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.  a, b, and c indicate the difference between the coefficients of 
the Large and Small banks is statistically significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
 
Borrowers Lenders
Large Small Large Small Large Small Large Small
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
2 weeks pre-Lehman (8/29-9/4) -0.117 -0.046 0.088 0.689 0.118 b -0.079 b 0.173 -0.292
(0.075) (0.103) (0.381) (0.712) (0.082) (0.053) (0.425) (0.369)
1 week pre-Lehman (9/5-9/11) -0.047 0.057 0.368 -0.317 0.079 -0.028 0.573 * b -0.666 * b
(0.074) (0.065) (0.305) (0.549) (0.074) (0.055) (0.344) (0.382)
Friday (9/12) -0.084 0.119 -0.166 c -1.283 *** c 0.134 -0.006 0.359 -0.364
(0.099) (0.085) (0.501) (0.425) (0.118) (0.073) (0.511) (0.589)
Monday (9/15) -0.289 ** -0.060 -0.491 -1.081 ** -0.002 -0.194 ** 0.280 -0.339
(0.117) (0.119) (0.585) (0.436) (0.103) (0.080) (0.529) (0.519)
Tuesday (9/16) -0.079 -0.196 0.117 0.421 -0.070 -0.199 ** 0.411 -0.507
(0.096) (0.130) (0.424) (0.575) (0.102) (0.082) (0.523) (0.550)
Post-AIG, pre-IOR (9/17-10/8) -0.267 *** -0.082 -0.300 0.635 -0.084 -0.177 *** 0.020 -0.468
(0.084) (0.092) (0.410) (1.275) (0.073) (0.062) (0.373) (0.395)
Post-IOR, pre-CPP (10/9-10/13) -0.289 *** -0.536 ** -0.030 a 17.315 *** a -0.157 -0.064 -0.712 -0.712
(0.108) (0.224) (0.575) (5.604) (0.143) (0.084) (0.665) (0.530)
1 month post-CPP (10/14-11/10) -0.273 *** a -0.171 a 0.351 0.660 -0.543 *** a -0.185 * a 0.011 -1.456 *
(0.103) (0.168) (0.497) (1.676) (0.122) (0.097) (0.638) (0.761)
2 months post-CPP (11/11-12/8) -0.355 *** a -0.422 ** a 0.552 -2.067 -0.781 *** a -0.240 ** a 0.535 c -1.757 ** c
(0.122) (0.182) (0.565) (2.143) (0.223) (0.103) (1.157) (0.746)
3 months post-CPP (12/9-1/5) -0.617 *** a -0.124 a 2.560 *** c -2.047 c -0.752 *** a -0.417 *** a 0.567 -1.095 *
(0.162) (0.207) (0.948) (2.431) (0.229) (0.106) (1.163) (0.587)
4 months post-CPP (1/6-2/2) -0.528 *** a -0.106 a 1.622 * b -2.394 b -0.421 *** a -0.353 *** a 0.417 -0.724
(0.167) (0.232) (0.852) (1.687) (0.160) (0.128) (0.748) (0.467)
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Borrowers Lenders
Large Small Large Small Large Small Large Small
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
5 months post-CPP (2/3-2/28) -0.615 *** a -0.003 a 0.798 -2.223 -0.414 ** a -0.197 a 1.497 ** a -1.517 * a
(0.166) (0.388) (0.820) (3.621) (0.169) (0.128) (0.744) (0.834)
2 weeks pre-Lehman x %NPL -31.328 -10.270 * 0.973 -2.858
(21.065) (5.902) (3.721) (1.798)
1 week pre-Lehman x %NPL -49.652 *** a -7.077 a 7.881 * b -2.307 b
(13.668) (4.812) (4.100) (1.647)
Friday x %NPL -31.274 -7.946 * 6.189 -4.328
(22.139) (4.127) (6.602) (2.683)
Monday x %NPL -49.159 *** c -12.037 *** c 0.397 -5.779 *
(19.010) (2.695) (5.463) (3.172)
Tuesday x %NPL -35.325 -6.169 4.378 -4.511
(25.199) (11.294) (5.699) (2.946)
Post-AIG, pre-IOR x %NPL -46.921 *** a -1.719 a 0.407 -4.041
(14.919) (6.967) (4.188) (2.777)
Post-IOR, pre-CPP x %NPL 2.210 8.930 *** -0.775 0.506
(34.169) (2.721) (6.460) (3.569)
1 month post-CPP x %NPL -13.318 0.273 -5.864 -2.440
(16.879) (6.538) (8.891) (3.930)
2 months post-CPP x %NPL -22.377 -0.176 -41.814 c 3.048 c
(24.474) (9.595) (26.048) (5.003)
3 months post-CPP x %NPL -59.911 ** c -2.376 c -62.531 ** b 8.326 * b
(28.361) (7.708) (31.182) (4.464)
4 months post-CPP x %NPL -46.724 ** -45.739 *** -15.362 8.426
(23.171) (13.123) (17.222) (6.077)
5 months post-CPP x %NPL -59.883 ** -55.411 -22.824 * 1.737
(29.141) (64.818) (12.635) (7.978)
2 weeks pre-Lehman x Assets 0.010 -0.100 -0.007 0.050
(0.047) (0.129) (0.047) (0.067)
1 week pre-Lehman x Assets 0.006 0.079 -0.063 * b 0.130 * b
(0.033) (0.094) (0.037) (0.072)
Friday x Assets 0.038 b 0.258 *** b -0.032 0.082
(0.048) (0.082) (0.051) (0.113)
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Borrowers Lenders
Large Small Large Small Large Small Large Small
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Monday x Assets 0.066 0.206 ** -0.030 0.043
(0.059) (0.082) (0.056) (0.096)
Tuesday x Assets 0.014 -0.095 -0.056 0.072
(0.043) (0.108) (0.045) (0.103)
Post-AIG, pre-IOR x Assets 0.047 -0.111 -0.011 0.067
(0.041) (0.214) (0.034) (0.078)
Post-IOR, pre-CPP x Assets -0.027 a -2.888 *** a 0.058 0.124
(0.082) (0.908) (0.068) (0.109)
1 month post-CPP x Assets -0.049 -0.133 -0.047 c 0.251 * c
(0.053) (0.300) (0.061) (0.148)
2 months post-CPP x Assets -0.067 0.289 -0.072 c 0.283 * c
(0.059) (0.353) (0.108) (0.151)
3 months post-CPP x Assets -0.251 *** 0.336 -0.049 0.109
(0.096) (0.400) (0.100) (0.123)
4 months post-CPP x Assets -0.167 * c 0.437 c -0.061 0.048
(0.100) (0.293) (0.066) (0.103)
5 months post-CPP x Assets -0.081 0.438 -0.154 ** b 0.250 b
(0.100) (0.605) (0.068) (0.166)
Fixed Effects Borrower Borrower Borrower Borrower Lender Lender Lender Lender
N 13,887 1,951 13,887 1,951 10,469 9,233 10,469 9,233
Adjusted-R2 0.81 0.78 0.82 0.78 0.83 0.94 0.84 0.94
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Table IA.VII 
Impact of the Lehman Event on Number of Counterparties (Full) 
The sample for borrowers consists of 21,003 observations from 360 borrowers from April 1, 2008 to February 28, 2009.  The sample for lenders consists of 26,700 observations 
from 376 lenders from April 1, 2008 to February 28, 2009.  We divide the samples into terciles, where Large is the top tercile of assets and Small is the bottom tercile of assets.  
The dependent variable is Counterparties – the logarithm of the number of counterparties each bank has on that day.  Assets is the logarithm of bank assets (in U.S. $ millions).  
%NPL is total nonperforming loans divided by total loans.  Amount / Assets is amount borrowed (lent) as a percent of bank assets.  Bank characteristics are measured as of the Call 
Report as of December 2007.  Standard errors are clustered at the bank level.  ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.  a, b, and c 
indicate the difference between the coefficients of the Large and Small banks is statistically significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
Borrowers Lenders
Large Small Large Small Large Small Large Small
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
2 weeks pre-Lehman (8/29-9/4) 0.009 -0.001 -0.011 -0.022 0.015 -0.016 -0.124 -0.297
(0.036) (0.027) (0.179) (0.169) (0.034) (0.027) (0.156) (0.287)
1 week pre-Lehman (9/5-9/11) 0.005 0.030 0.060 -0.111 0.016 0.005 0.052 -0.229
(0.036) (0.024) (0.186) (0.258) (0.039) (0.032) (0.194) (0.321)
Friday (9/12) -0.005 0.041 0.004 -0.220 0.069 0.032 -0.101 -0.130
(0.051) (0.043) (0.211) (0.208) (0.057) (0.028) (0.297) (0.211)
Monday (9/15) -0.129 ** a 0.038 a 0.332 -0.244 -0.024 -0.042 0.273 -0.159
(0.052) (0.037) (0.260) (0.274) (0.057) (0.041) (0.252) (0.230)
Tuesday (9/16) -0.078 b 0.151 ** b 0.708 ** a -0.481 * a -0.034 -0.051 -0.131 -0.222
(0.054) (0.076) (0.292) (0.291) (0.072) (0.042) (0.376) (0.355)
Post-AIG, pre-IOR (9/17-10/8) -0.060 c 0.067 c 0.538 *** c -0.502 c -0.122 *** -0.035 -0.122 -0.295
(0.040) (0.056) (0.188) (0.523) (0.040) (0.041) (0.203) (0.372)
Post-IOR, pre-CPP (10/9-10/13) -0.113 ** -0.030 0.522 * 0.067 -0.245 *** a 0.034 a -0.366 -0.658 *
(0.056) (0.031) (0.277) (1.832) (0.078) (0.053) (0.354) (0.362)
1 month post-CPP (10/14-11/10) -0.267 *** a -0.003 a 0.973 *** b -0.054 b -0.302 *** a -0.083 a 0.053 -0.778
(0.054) (0.032) (0.266) (0.299) (0.051) (0.069) (0.237) (0.713)
2 months post-CPP (11/11-12/8) -0.487 *** a -0.027 a 1.407 *** a 0.228 a -0.474 *** a -0.162 ** a 0.476 -0.441
(0.069) (0.034) (0.330) (0.221) (0.085) (0.079) (0.443) (0.657)
3 months post-CPP (12/9-1/5) -0.544 *** a -0.004 a 1.988 *** a 0.089 a -0.571 *** a -0.238 *** a 0.030 0.090
(0.087) (0.041) (0.426) (0.197) (0.097) (0.073) (0.486) (0.535)
4 months post-CPP (1/6-2/2) -0.411 *** a 0.060 a 1.646 *** a 0.252 a -0.389 *** a -0.207 *** a -0.224 0.422
(0.075) (0.040) (0.348) (0.281) (0.059) (0.076) (0.347) (0.365)
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Borrowers Lenders
Large Small Large Small Large Small Large Small
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
5 months post-CPP (2/3-2/28) -0.385 *** a 0.040 a 1.023 *** c 0.186 c -0.338 *** a -0.196 ** a 0.356 -0.209
(0.068) (0.040) (0.307) (0.301) (0.075) (0.097) (0.394) (0.475)
2 weeks pre-Lehman x %NPL -11.863 -0.028 3.653 ** 0.658
(9.125) (1.262) (1.809) (0.613)
1 week pre-Lehman x %NPL -20.991 *** a -1.130 a 5.224 ** b -0.007 b
(6.547) (1.249) (2.432) (0.780)
Friday x %NPL -12.604 -4.871 5.255 c -0.504 c
(10.730) (3.517) (3.353) (0.724)
Monday x %NPL -16.927 ** b -0.964 b 7.800 *** b -0.688 b
(7.678) (1.729) (2.938) (1.586)
Tuesday x %NPL -22.845 ** -3.876 3.213 -1.099
(11.065) (3.453) (4.364) (1.856)
Post-AIG, pre-IOR x %NPL -22.105 ** b 0.809 b 0.228 -0.088
(9.567) (1.874) (2.592) (0.974)
Post-IOR, pre-CPP x %NPL -23.640 * c -0.245 c 6.898 * 1.300
(12.500) (0.993) (3.950) (2.113)
1 month post-CPP x %NPL -6.547 0.761 0.638 -0.705
(9.678) (1.446) (4.197) (1.982)
2 months post-CPP x %NPL -2.101 1.736 -9.668 0.931
(8.654) (1.255) (9.065) (3.236)
3 months post-CPP x %NPL -11.552 1.437 -10.455 1.772
(11.196) (1.601) (14.469) (2.848)
4 months post-CPP x %NPL -8.803 -8.736 -2.548 4.453 *
(9.928) (6.868) (6.152) (2.459)
5 months post-CPP x %NPL -11.942 -9.318 -6.998 3.095
(11.450) (10.241) (8.153) (3.133)
2 weeks pre-Lehman x Assets 0.013 0.003 0.009 0.053
(0.020) (0.035) (0.016) (0.052)
1 week pre-Lehman x Assets 0.014 0.026 -0.012 0.045
(0.020) (0.046) (0.019) (0.058)
Friday x Assets 0.011 0.051 0.010 0.033
(0.021) (0.046) (0.027) (0.041)
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Borrowers Lenders
Large Small Large Small Large Small Large Small
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Monday x Assets -0.030 0.051 -0.043 * 0.024
(0.027) (0.056) (0.024) (0.045)
Tuesday x Assets -0.057 * a 0.119 ** a 0.005 0.036
(0.032) (0.060) (0.032) (0.066)
Post-AIG, pre-IOR x Assets -0.039 * 0.092 0.000 0.051
(0.023) (0.094) (0.019) (0.068)
Post-IOR, pre-CPP x Assets -0.041 -0.014 0.003 0.130 *
(0.032) (0.296) (0.033) (0.071)
1 month post-CPP x Assets -0.116 *** b 0.008 b -0.036 0.136
(0.030) (0.053) (0.022) (0.131)
2 months post-CPP x Assets -0.183 *** b -0.044 b -0.078 ** 0.052
(0.039) (0.038) (0.039) (0.128)
3 months post-CPP x Assets -0.237 *** a -0.016 a -0.044 -0.067
(0.050) (0.035) (0.039) (0.106)
4 months post-CPP x Assets -0.195 *** a -0.023 a -0.013 -0.134 **
(0.040) (0.045) (0.031) (0.068)
5 months post-CPP x Assets -0.127 *** c -0.015 c -0.058 * -0.007
(0.037) (0.046) (0.035) (0.085)
Amount / Assets 28.081 *** 2.329 26.976 *** a 2.314 a 5.081 *** 0.199 ** 5.158 *** a 0.203 ** a
(3.638) (1.693) (3.362) (1.690) (1.717) (0.089) (1.745) (0.090)
Fixed Effects Borrower Borrower Borrower Borrower Lender Lender Lender Lender
N 13,887 1,951 13,887 1,951 10,469 9,233 10,469 9,233
Adjusted-R2 0.87 0.62 0.89 0.62 0.85 0.92 0.85 0.92
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Table IA.VIII 
Discount Window Borrowing (Full) 
The sample consists of 64,583 observations from 360 borrowers from April 1, 2008 to February 28, 2009. The dependent 
variable is Access, an indicator variable equal to one if the bank borrowed from the discount window on that day.  Percent 
Borrowers is the daily number of active borrowers as a percent of the total number of borrowers in the sample, averaged across 
the days in the different time periods.  Assets is the logarithm of bank assets (in U.S. $ millions).  %NPL is the amount of non-
performing loans divided by the amount of total loans.  ROA is net income divided by assets.  Previous Fed Funds Amount is the 
logarithm of the total amount borrowed in the fed funds market on the most recent previous day.  Previous Fed Funds Spread is 
the weighted average spread paid in the fed funds market on the most recent previous day.  Same Day Fed Funds Amount is the 
logarithm of the total amount borrowed in the fed funds market on the same day.  Same Day Fed Funds Access Dummy is an 
indicator variable equal to one if the bank borrowed in the fed funds market on that day.  Bank characteristics are measured as of 
the Call Report as of December 2007.  Standard errors are clustered at the bank level.  ***, **, and * indicate statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
Percent %NPL RoA
Borrowers (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
2 weeks pre-Lehman (8/29-9/4) 1.0 0.057  -0.879 *** -0.786  -0.909 *** -0.823  
(0.176) (0.308) (0.536) (0.315) (0.512)
1 week pre-Lehman (9/5-9/11) 1.6 0.253 ** -1.006 *** -0.922 * -0.970 *** -0.885 *
(0.116) (0.290) (0.479) (0.285) (0.461)
Friday (9/12) 1.7 0.266  -1.212 *** -1.156 ** -1.085 *** -1.035 **
(0.163) (0.384) (0.556) (0.330) (0.507)
Monday (9/15) 3.9 0.640 *** -0.175  -0.051  -0.155  -0.037  
(0.139) (0.337) (0.546) (0.333) (0.526)
Tuesday (9/16) 1.7 0.264  -0.724 ** -0.665  -0.597 * -0.543  
(0.180) (0.287) (0.490) (0.335) (0.511)
Post-AIG, pre-IOR (9/17-10/8) 2.3 0.387 *** -0.115  -0.025  -0.082  -0.013  
(0.096) (0.373) (0.560) (0.323) (0.494)
Post-IOR, pre-CPP (10/9-10/13) 2.4 0.379 *** 1.188  1.300  1.207 * 1.288  
(0.142) (0.743) (0.878) (0.670) (0.791)
1 month post-CPP (10/14-11/10) 2.1 0.317 *** 0.574  0.689  0.621  0.710  
(0.122) (0.548) (0.712) (0.498) (0.645)
2 months post-CPP (11/11-12/8) 2.5 0.396 *** 0.807  0.938  0.825 * 0.928  
(0.127) (0.516) (0.673) (0.483) (0.624)
3 months post-CPP (12/9-1/5) 2.9 0.439 *** 1.039 ** 1.207 ** 1.034 ** 1.178 **
(0.112) (0.432) (0.580) (0.402) (0.538)
4 months post-CPP (1/6-2/2) 3.7 0.519 *** 0.836 * 0.998 * 0.830 ** 0.966 *
(0.122) (0.454) (0.601) (0.406) (0.539)
5 months post-CPP (2/3-2/28) 3.2 0.443 *** 0.950 * 1.112 * 0.947 ** 1.083 *
(0.125) (0.520) (0.649) (0.470) (0.586)
2 weeks pre-Lehman x Characteristic -17.938  -17.322  -29.462  -30.274  
(18.984) (18.761) (22.153) (21.743)
1 week pre-Lehman x Characteristic -2.970  -2.666  -25.286  -26.473  
(7.859) (7.768) (16.795) (16.175)
Friday x Characteristic 3.473  3.756  -34.010  -33.989  
(5.280) (5.240) (24.860) (24.646)
Monday x Characteristic -4.312  -4.294  -50.817 ** -52.650 **
(9.773) (9.803) (24.612) (24.136)
Tuesday x Characteristic 7.767 * 7.921 * -75.161 *** -75.552 ***
(4.315) (4.328) (27.737) (27.432)
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Percent %NPL RoA
Borrowers (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Post-AIG, pre-IOR x Characteristic 1.546  1.562  -43.624 ** -45.363 ***
(3.762) (3.815) (17.305) (16.914)
Post-IOR, pre-CPP x Characteristic 4.578  4.498  -41.523  -44.179 *
(5.462) (5.562) (25.291) (24.892)
1 month post-CPP x Characteristic 3.936  3.943  -27.866  -30.432  
(4.312) (4.378) (24.591) (24.161)
2 months post-CPP x Characteristic 1.410  1.334  -24.302  -26.428  
(3.377) (3.366) (24.271) (24.108)
3 months post-CPP x Characteristic -0.575  -0.505  -19.461  -20.650  
(3.995) (3.935) (21.304) (21.931)
4 months post-CPP x Characteristic -1.381  -1.398  -28.154  -29.370  
(4.754) (4.702) (23.954) (24.481)
5 months post-CPP x Characteristic -0.115  -0.179  -22.498  -23.464  
(4.482) (4.410) (26.352) (26.714)
2 weeks pre-Lehman x Assets 0.135 *** 0.122 * 0.122 *** 0.111 *
(0.049) (0.074) (0.038) (0.064)
1 week pre-Lehman x Assets 0.156 *** 0.145 ** 0.152 *** 0.142 **
(0.034) (0.060) (0.034) (0.056)
Friday x Assets 0.172 *** 0.164 ** 0.166 *** 0.160 **
(0.041) (0.066) (0.039) (0.062)
Monday x Assets 0.108 *** 0.093  0.106 *** 0.092  
(0.038) (0.064) (0.038) (0.062)
Tuesday x Assets 0.109 *** 0.103 * 0.108 *** 0.104 *
(0.034) (0.058) (0.037) (0.058)
Post-AIG, pre-IOR x Assets 0.062  0.052  0.065 * 0.058  
(0.043) (0.066) (0.038) (0.059)
Post-IOR, pre-CPP x Assets -0.120  -0.131  -0.108  -0.115  
(0.101) (0.115) (0.089) (0.102)
1 month post-CPP x Assets -0.041  -0.055  -0.036  -0.047  
(0.069) (0.091) (0.062) (0.082)
2 months post-CPP x Assets -0.058  -0.075  -0.053  -0.067  
(0.065) (0.086) (0.060) (0.079)
3 months post-CPP x Assets -0.081  -0.103  -0.077 * -0.096  
(0.051) (0.069) (0.046) (0.062)
4 months post-CPP x Assets -0.041  -0.062  -0.037  -0.054  
(0.054) (0.071) (0.048) (0.063)
5 months post-CPP x Assets -0.069  -0.089  -0.064  -0.081  
(0.064) (0.078) (0.057) (0.069)
Previous Fed Funds 0.068  0.068  
Amount (0.070) (0.069)
Previous Fed Funds 0.086  0.118  
Spread (0.209) (0.209)
Same Day Fed Funds -0.071  -0.072  
Amount (0.051) (0.052)
Same Day Fed Funds 0.238  0.250  
Access Dummy (0.186) (0.186)
Borrower Fixed Effects No No No No No
N 64,583 64,583 64,583 64,583 64,583
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Table IA.IX 
 Impact of Lehman Event on Spread, Amount and Counterparties for Borrowers,  
 Split By Demand Proxies (Full) 
The sample consists of 21,003 observations from 360 borrowers from April 1, 2008 to February 28, 2009.  We divide the samples 
into terciles where banks in the bottom tercile have %Repo of less than 0.00176 and banks in the top tercile have %Repo greater 
than or equal to 0.03721.  The dependent variables are: Spread to Target – the weighted average spread between banks’ fed funds 
loans and the target federal funds rate on that day; Amount – the logarithm of the amount borrowed in the fed funds market on 
that day (in U.S. $ millions); and Counterparties – the logarithm of the number of counterparties each bank has on that day.  
Assets is the logarithm of bank assets (in U.S. $ millions).  %Repo is the amount of securities sold under agreements to 
repurchase divided by the amount of total assets.  %NPL is total nonperforming loans divided by total loans.  Amount / Assets is 
amount borrowed as a percent of bank assets.  Bank characteristics are measured as of the Call Report as of December 2007.  
Standard errors are clustered at the bank level.  ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, 
respectively.  Coefficients are bolded where their difference is statistically significant.  a, b, and c indicate the difference between 
the coefficients of the Large and Small banks is statistically significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
Spread to Target Amount Counterparties
< 0.0  ≥ 0.04 < 0.0  ≥ 0.04 < 0.0  ≥ 0.04
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
2 weeks pre-Lehman (8/29-9/4) -0.108 * c 0.037 c -0.721 * -0.108 -0.573 *** a 0.192 * a
(0.063) (0.042) (0.376) (0.354) (0.154) (0.112)
1 week pre-Lehman (9/5-9/11) 0.015 -0.004 -1.021 *** a 0.149 a -0.322 *** a 0.241 a
(0.131) (0.033) (0.364) (0.262) (0.077) (0.170)
Friday (9/12) 0.135 0.018 -0.554 -0.489 -0.225 * b 0.189 b
(0.116) (0.059) (0.370) (0.484) (0.124) (0.135)
Monday (9/15) -0.498 0.229 -1.006 ** -0.319 -0.569 ** a 0.438 ** a
(1.146) (0.548) (0.474) (0.536) (0.258) (0.207)
Tuesday (9/16) 1.225 * c -0.081 c -0.413 0.240 0.245 0.700 ***
(0.648) (0.387) (0.516) (0.397) (0.272) (0.234)
Post-AIG, pre-IOR (9/17-10/8) 1.324 *** a 0.098 a -0.900 * -0.647 ** -0.168 a 0.615 *** a
(0.165) (0.277) (0.503) (0.280) (0.170) (0.159)
Post-IOR, pre-CPP (10/9-10/13) 1.965 *** a -0.011 a -1.910 ** -0.415 0.078 0.546 **
(0.711) (0.242) (0.952) (0.586) (0.215) (0.238)
1 month post-CPP (10/14-11/10) 0.671 *** c 0.200 c -0.383 -0.107 0.769 *** 0.758 ***
(0.187) (0.170) (0.372) (0.376) (0.274) (0.183)
2 months post-CPP (11/11-12/8) 0.696 *** 0.272 ** 2.135 -0.212 2.102 ** 1.229 ***
(0.233) (0.126) (2.141) (0.472) (0.957) (0.248)
3 months post-CPP (12/9-1/5) 1.116 *** 0.472 *** -0.275 0.650 0.811 1.477 ***
(0.401) (0.112) (1.557) (0.640) (0.681) (0.302)
4 months post-CPP (1/6-2/2) 0.609 *** 0.421 *** -1.223 c 0.391 c 0.570 1.129 ***
(0.163) (0.069) (0.787) (0.494) (0.348) (0.123)
5 months post-CPP (2/3-2/28) 0.645 *** c 0.384 *** c -1.539 -0.640 0.053 b 0.886 *** b
(0.144) (0.065) (0.961) (0.551) (0.357) (0.147)
2 weeks pre-Lehman x %NPL 0.455 -2.081 -19.464 *** -13.340 1.347 -1.512
(0.994) (1.482) (5.403) (18.322) (2.276) (6.158)
1 week pre-Lehman x %NPL -0.078 1.489 -4.030 b -35.433 ** b -0.901 -8.516
(1.416) (1.239) (6.195) (14.462) (1.558) (7.377)
Friday x %NPL -4.313 * 3.065 -23.585 * -55.830 * -6.975 ** -11.256
(2.382) (3.848) (12.304) (31.591) (3.447) (8.868)
Monday x %NPL 1.230 b 56.991 ** b -27.732 * -19.842 0.699 5.921
(9.540) (25.808) (14.304) (25.536) (2.526) (9.915)
Tuesday x %NPL -15.961 ** -2.873 -18.191 -34.729 ** -10.814 ** -6.150
(7.541) (6.291) (17.008) (14.169) (5.106) (11.703)
Post-AIG, pre-IOR x %NPL -8.171 * b 9.691 b 2.944 b -23.874 * b -1.927 -8.148
(4.730) (7.600) (5.530) (12.373) (1.630) (10.662)
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Spread to Target Amount Counterparties
< 0.0  ≥ 0.04 < 0.0  ≥ 0.04 < 0.0  ≥ 0.04
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Post-IOR, pre-CPP x %NPL -10.226 2.973 16.987 * -18.890 0.446 -19.795
(9.763) (11.334) (10.098) (39.931) (2.216) (13.864)
1 month post-CPP x %NPL 5.159 -0.311 -7.708 -0.818 -3.075 ** -7.488
(4.121) (4.494) (9.504) (19.083) (1.447) (9.674)
2 months post-CPP x %NPL 0.456 -2.654 -9.310 -15.664 -11.136 ** -4.167
(6.175) (3.661) (13.450) (17.812) (5.582) (7.758)
3 months post-CPP x %NPL -8.333 -0.667 -0.097 -16.744 -0.468 -9.475
(7.369) (4.297) (12.463) (15.661) (3.236) (8.019)
4 months post-CPP x %NPL 3.455 2.883 -18.568 -28.738 -1.962 -11.220
(2.579) (2.906) (13.634) (18.291) (3.344) (7.137)
5 months post-CPP x %NPL 2.990 * 1.378 -29.372 ** -40.133 -7.449 -22.637 **
(1.792) (4.039) (12.385) (30.257) (6.988) (10.958)
2 weeks pre-Lehman x Assets 0.016 ** b -0.001 b 0.158 *** b 0.007 b 0.084 *** a -0.014 a
(0.007) (0.005) (0.051) (0.039) (0.020) (0.012)
1 week pre-Lehman x Assets 0.001 -0.004 0.172 *** a 0.013 a 0.049 *** a -0.011 a
(0.015) (0.003) (0.047) (0.026) (0.011) (0.020)
Friday x Assets -0.002 0.004 0.140 *** 0.096 0.045 ** 0.002
(0.014) (0.009) (0.053) (0.065) (0.022) (0.016)
Monday x Assets 0.186 -0.043 0.200 *** c 0.037 c 0.084 ** a -0.052 ** a
(0.158) (0.063) (0.066) (0.069) (0.037) (0.025)
Tuesday x Assets -0.132 * c 0.020 c 0.085 0.000 -0.013 -0.066 ***
(0.080) (0.041) (0.079) (0.036) (0.037) (0.023)
Post-AIG, pre-IOR x Assets -0.170 *** a -0.040 a 0.115 * 0.072 *** 0.033 * a -0.056 *** a
(0.021) (0.031) (0.063) (0.026) (0.020) (0.018)
Post-IOR, pre-CPP x Assets -0.254 *** a -0.038 a 0.222 ** 0.023 -0.017 -0.045 *
(0.076) (0.027) (0.103) (0.092) (0.029) (0.027)
1 month post-CPP x Assets -0.128 *** c -0.075 *** c 0.051 -0.006 -0.100 *** -0.088 ***
(0.022) (0.017) (0.042) (0.037) (0.036) (0.021)
2 months post-CPP x Assets -0.113 *** -0.069 *** -0.319 0.013 -0.265 ** -0.155 ***
(0.026) (0.012) (0.274) (0.044) (0.124) (0.029)
3 months post-CPP x Assets -0.108 ** -0.055 *** -0.014 -0.092 -0.108 -0.178 ***
(0.052) (0.012) (0.210) (0.067) (0.090) (0.035)
4 months post-CPP x Assets -0.043 ** -0.027 *** 0.153 c -0.042 c -0.063 -0.131 ***
(0.021) (0.008) (0.105) (0.044) (0.047) (0.012)
5 months post-CPP x Assets -0.051 *** -0.018 ** 0.222 * 0.060 0.033 b -0.095 *** b
(0.019) (0.009) (0.131) (0.055) (0.054) (0.019)
Amount / Assets 0.893 * 0.293 11.045 *** a 29.408 *** a
(0.480) (0.647) (2.200) ** (3.239) ***
Borrower Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 2,799 9,927 2,799 9,927 2,799 9,927
Adjusted R2 0.58 0.50 0.85 0.87 0.89 0.93
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Table IA.X 
Impact of Lehman Event on Spread, Amount and Counterparties for Lenders,  
Split By Demand Proxies (Full) 
The sample consists of 26,700 observations from 376 lenders from April 1, 2008 to February 28, 2009.  We divide the sample 
into terciles, where banks in the bottom tercile have %Repo equal to zero and banks in the top tercile have %Repo greater than or 
equal to 0.02502.  The dependent variables are: Spread to Target – the weighted average spread between banks’ fed funds loans 
and the target federal funds rate on that day; Amount – the logarithm of the amount lent in the fed funds market on that day (in 
U.S. $ millions); and Counterparties – the logarithm of the number of counterparties each bank has on that day.  Assets is the 
logarithm of bank assets (in U.S. $ millions).  %Repo is the amount of securities sold under agreements to repurchase divided by 
the amount of total assets.  %NPL is total nonperforming loans divided by total loans.  Amount / Assets is amount lent as a 
percent of bank assets.  Bank characteristics are measured as of the Call Report as of December 2007.  Standard errors are 
clustered at the bank level.  ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.  a, b, and c 
indicate the difference between the coefficients of the Large and Small banks is statistically significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
level, respectively. 
 
Spread to Target Amount Counterparties
≤ 0.0  ≥ 0.03 ≤ 0.0  ≥ 0.03 ≤ 0.0  ≥ 0.03
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
2 weeks pre-Lehman (8/29-9/4) -0.012 b 0.160 ** b -0.115 0.022 -0.011 0.066
(0.031) (0.072) (0.227) (0.251) (0.130) (0.131)
1 week pre-Lehman (9/5-9/11) 0.002 0.040 -0.292 c 0.279 c -0.090 -0.008
(0.029) (0.040) (0.218) (0.264) (0.144) (0.151)
Friday (9/12) 0.071 ** 0.084 * -0.120 0.081 -0.104 -0.070
(0.036) (0.050) (0.307) (0.325) (0.143) (0.175)
Monday (9/15) 1.064 *** a -0.673 a -0.008 -0.289 0.093 0.079
(0.359) (0.460) (0.287) (0.388) (0.120) (0.165)
Tuesday (9/16) 0.224 a -1.169 *** a -0.119 -0.073 0.049 -0.119
(0.207) (0.357) (0.378) (0.405) (0.212) (0.277)
Post-AIG, pre-IOR (9/17-10/8) -0.080 a -1.399 *** a -0.163 -0.269 0.076 -0.026
(0.209) (0.145) (0.262) (0.340) (0.203) (0.169)
Post-IOR, pre-CPP (10/9-10/13) -0.480 * c -1.073 *** c 0.215 0.106 0.260 0.111
(0.267) (0.198) (0.324) (0.435) (0.241) (0.277)
1 month post-CPP (10/14-11/10) -0.557 *** -0.660 *** 0.218 0.166 0.235 0.117
(0.177) (0.149) (0.501) (0.523) (0.380) (0.224)
2 months post-CPP (11/11-12/8) -0.403 * -0.382 *** -0.061 0.906 0.383 0.571
(0.223) (0.145) (0.674) (0.966) (0.476) (0.396)
3 months post-CPP (12/9-1/5) -0.107 -0.042 -0.971 0.750 0.324 0.227
(0.193) (0.148) (0.934) (0.917) (0.525) (0.414)
4 months post-CPP (1/6-2/2) 0.194 0.247 *** -1.046 0.344 0.190 0.132
(0.152) (0.078) (0.813) (0.619) (0.347) (0.383)
5 months post-CPP (2/3-2/28) 0.202 0.305 *** -1.460 * a 1.333 ** a -0.195 0.594 *
(0.123) (0.074) (0.762) (0.528) (0.407) (0.332)
2 weeks pre-Lehman x %NPL -0.150 0.698 -4.791 *** 4.921 -0.076 b 5.416 ** b
(0.166) (0.715) (1.317) (6.026) (0.447) (2.755)
1 week pre-Lehman x %NPL 0.066 -1.441 -3.616 ** a 14.509 ** a -0.130 b 8.815 ** b
(0.147) (1.119) (1.570) (6.613) (0.494) (3.880)
Friday x %NPL -0.256 -0.317 -3.825 * 9.755 -0.555 6.197
(0.310) (0.894) (2.203) (8.199) (0.651) (4.471)
Monday x %NPL -1.815 -0.856 -2.912 11.378 -0.103 b 11.029 ** b
(2.971) (9.420) (2.905) (9.846) (0.824) (4.549)
Tuesday x %NPL -2.436 c 8.943 c -3.405 ** b 13.890 b -0.501 3.841
(1.858) (5.553) (1.511) (8.679) (0.745) (6.485)
Post-AIG, pre-IOR x %NPL -3.006 ** 1.871 -4.935 *** c 7.186 c -0.755 -1.596
(1.235) (2.786) (1.491) (7.061) (0.690) (3.943)
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Spread to Target Amount Counterparties
≤ 0.0  ≥ 0.03 ≤ 0.0  ≥ 0.03 ≤ 0.0  ≥ 0.03
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Post-IOR, pre-CPP x %NPL -2.380 ** 3.848 -3.904 ** -1.336 0.822 -5.529
(1.149) (4.901) (1.947) (11.943) (1.239) (7.314)
1 month post-CPP x %NPL -1.759 -0.675 -1.888 -18.170 -1.738 -0.666
(1.300) (3.791) (3.967) (12.038) (2.155) (5.553)
2 months post-CPP x %NPL -0.218 4.276 -0.166 -50.785 -2.024 -9.676
(1.592) (4.417) (3.986) (33.962) (3.516) (14.623)
3 months post-CPP x %NPL -1.414 6.288 4.231 c -68.709 * c -0.705 -19.899
(1.415) (5.966) (4.262) (39.118) (3.324) (17.495)
4 months post-CPP x %NPL -0.219 1.316 5.583 c -22.703 c 0.567 -4.908
(1.142) (3.137) (5.178) (15.498) (2.764) (6.162)
5 months post-CPP x %NPL -0.731 0.497 -3.463 c -37.325 ** c -1.115 -6.954
(0.966) (2.848) (8.013) (16.120) (3.644) (9.184)
2 weeks pre-Lehman x Assets 0.004 b -0.018 ** b 0.028 -0.007 -0.003 -0.011
(0.005) (0.009) (0.037) (0.030) (0.020) (0.015)
1 week pre-Lehman x Assets -0.004 -0.003 0.060 * b -0.054 * b 0.015 -0.011
(0.005) (0.005) (0.035) (0.030) (0.021) (0.017)
Friday x Assets -0.001 -0.001 0.025 -0.019 0.025 0.003
(0.005) (0.006) (0.052) (0.031) (0.025) (0.018)
Monday x Assets -0.131 ** a 0.095 ** a -0.017 0.005 -0.020 -0.027
(0.057) (0.047) (0.050) (0.044) (0.019) (0.018)
Tuesday x Assets -0.088 *** a 0.094 ** a -0.003 -0.023 -0.016 0.003
(0.032) (0.043) (0.065) (0.032) (0.037) (0.024)
Post-AIG, pre-IOR x Assets -0.060 * a 0.098 *** a 0.019 -0.001 -0.022 -0.009
(0.032) (0.016) (0.044) (0.031) (0.031) (0.016)
Post-IOR, pre-CPP x Assets 0.003 0.054 ** -0.027 -0.040 -0.057 -0.035
(0.047) (0.023) (0.056) (0.042) (0.040) (0.024)
1 month post-CPP x Assets 0.007 0.014 -0.068 -0.050 -0.064 -0.039 *
(0.030) (0.015) (0.085) (0.055) (0.060) (0.022)
2 months post-CPP x Assets 0.002 -0.007 -0.041 -0.093 -0.108 -0.086 **
(0.038) (0.014) (0.124) (0.097) (0.083) (0.037)
3 months post-CPP x Assets 0.019 -0.006 0.091 -0.065 -0.112 -0.054
(0.031) (0.015) (0.178) (0.082) (0.097) (0.036)
4 months post-CPP x Assets -0.002 -0.003 0.117 -0.044 -0.077 -0.043
(0.024) (0.008) (0.153) (0.052) (0.058) (0.035)
5 months post-CPP x Assets 0.003 -0.005 0.264 * a -0.126 *** a 0.006 -0.082 **
(0.020) (0.007) (0.137) (0.046) (0.063) (0.032)
Amount / Assets -0.014 -0.002 0.195 ** 5.191
(0.022) (0.133) (0.082)  (3.195) ***
Lender Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 12,211 8,967 12,211 8,967 12,211 8,967
Adjusted R2 0.50 0.47 0.91 0.88 0.90 0.87
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Table IA.XIXI 
Demand Predictions 
The sample ranges from January 1, 2007 to August 29, 2008, where observations are included only if a bank borrowed on that 
day.  The dependent variable is Amount, the logarithm of the amount borrowed on that day.  Avg. Amount in Prev. Month is the 
logarithm of the average amount borrowed over the previous calendar month.  Customer Funds Sent and Customer Funds 
Received are the logarithm of customer funds sent and received.  Distance from Req. Reserves is the difference between a bank’s 
beginning-of-day balance (without any fed funds transactions) and the bank’s required reserve amount divided by total assets.   
Assets is the logarithm of bank assets (in U.S. $ millions).  ROA is net income divided by assets.  Risk Ratio is Tier 1 plus Tier 2 
Capital divided by assets.  %NPL is total nonperforming loans divided by total loans.  %MBS is the amount of mortgage-backed 
securities divided by the amount of total assets.  %Repo is the amount of securities sold under agreements to repurchase divided 
by the amount of total assets.  Target Rate is the overnight target rate set by the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC).  1M 
AA Asset-Backed CP, 1M Certificates of Deposit, 1M Financial CP, 1M LIBOR, and 1M OIS are one-month term rates on AA 
asset-backed commercial paper, certificates of deposit, financial commercial paper, LIBOR, and OIS.  On British holidays, 1M 
LIBOR is filled in with the previous business day’s rate.  Overnight Treasury Repo and Overnight MBS Repo are overnight rates 
on Treasury repos and MBS repos.  Bank characteristics are measured as of the Call Report as of December 2007.  Standard 
errors are clustered at the bank level.  ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.   
 
(1) (2)
Large Small
Avg. Amount in Prev. Month 0.825 *** 0.788 ***
Avg. Amount in Prev. Month 1 (0.035) (0.039)
Customer Funds Sent 0.026  0.055 **
Customer Funds Sent 1 (0.021) (0.027)
Customer Funds Received -0.026  0.021  
Customer Funds Received 1 (0.018) (0.026)
Distance from Req. Reserves -0.000  -0.000  
Distance from Req. Reserves 1 (0.000) (0.000)
Assets 0.100 ** 0.050  
Assets 1 (0.041) (0.045)
ROA -2.561  2.269  
ROA 1 (3.199) (4.595)
Risk Ratio -0.390  -0.086  
Risk Ratio 1 (0.407) (0.723)
%NPL 0.020  -0.187  
%NPL 1 (1.312) (1.627)
%MBS 0.583  0.409  
%MBS 1 (0.404) (0.593)
%Repo -0.966  -1.143  
%Repo 1 (0.684) (0.739)
Target Fed Funds Rate 0.106  -0.149  
Target Fed Funds Rate 1 (0.099) (0.136)
1M AA Asset-Backed CP -0.099  -0.094  
1M AA Asset-Backed CP 1 (0.077) (0.105)
1M Certificates of Deposit 0.289  -0.316  
1M Certificates of Deposit 1 (0.227) (0.396)
1M Financial CP 0.069  -0.068  
1M Financial CP 1 (0.103) (0.095)
1M LIBOR -0.371  0.232  
1M LIBOR 1 (0.254) (0.488)
Overnight Treasury Repo -0.066 *** -0.056 *
Overnight Treasury Repo 1 (0.019) (0.030)
Overnight MBS Repo -0.057  0.225 **
Overnight MBS Repo 1 (0.059) (0.087)
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(1) (2)
Large Small
1M OIS 0.101  0.199 *
1M OIS 1 (0.091) (0.121)
Maintenance Day Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Month Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Quarter End Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Observations 14,487 4,446
Adjusted R2 0.64 0.69
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Table IA.XII 
Determinants of Forecast Error 
The sample consists of 21,003 observations from 360 borrowers from April 1, 2008 to February 28, 2009.  We divide the sample 
into terciles, where Large is the top tercile of assets and Small is the bottom tercile of assets. The dependent variable is Predicted 
less Actual – the difference between the predicted estimate for borrowing calculated using the relationships estimated from 
January 1, 2007 to August 29, 2008 (presented in Table XI) and actual borrowing.  Assets is the logarithm of bank assets (in U.S. 
$ millions).  %NPL is total nonperforming loans divided by total loans.  Bank characteristics are measured as of the Call Report 
as of December 2007.  Standard errors are clustered at the bank level.  ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 
5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
Large Small Large Small
(1) (2) (3) (4)
2 weeks pre-Lehman (8/29-9/4) 0.216 *** 0.267 ** 0.017 0.026
(0.063) (0.105) (0.337) (0.488)
1 week pre-Lehman (9/5-9/11) 0.159 *** 0.237 *** -0.267 1.216
(0.060) (0.081) (0.271) (0.885)
Friday (9/12) 0.196 ** 0.059 0.114 0.128
(0.078) (0.055) (0.437) (0.235)
Monday (9/15) 0.157 b 0.509 *** b 1.784 ** c 0.385 c
(0.125) (0.091) (0.810) (0.249)
Tuesday (9/16) 0.216 ** 0.458 *** 1.048 c -0.454 c
(0.104) (0.144) (0.713) (0.344)
Post-AIG, pre-IOR (9/17-10/8) -0.461 *** a 0.371 *** a 0.899 -0.560
(0.098) (0.098) (0.615) (1.466)
Post-IOR, pre-CPP (10/9-10/13) -0.873 *** a 0.412 * a 1.787 * a 35.827 *** a
(0.128) (0.232) (1.013) (6.073)
1 month post-CPP (10/14-11/10) -0.570 *** a -0.040 a 1.622 ** -0.118
(0.106) (0.178) (0.703) (1.538)
2 months post-CPP (11/11-12/8) -0.315 ** a 0.305 *** a 2.786 ** 2.089 ***
(0.150) (0.110) (1.186) (0.696)
3 months post-CPP (12/9-1/5) 0.057 a 0.132 a 1.454 2.118
(0.149) (0.314) (1.307) (2.241)
4 months post-CPP (1/6-2/2) 0.114 a 0.401 ** a 2.434 * 1.872
(0.160) (0.178) (1.274) (1.409)
5 months post-CPP (2/3-2/28) -0.012 a -0.076 a 3.456 ** 0.199
(0.170) (0.242) (1.497) (2.246)
2 weeks pre-Lehman x %NPL 8.939 8.909 *
(15.326) (5.286)
1 week pre-Lehman x %NPL 30.783 *** b 4.679 b
(10.756) (4.965)
Friday x %NPL 16.603 3.951
(16.712) (2.586)
Monday x %NPL 44.237 ** c 8.814 *** c
(18.753) (1.584)
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Large Small Large Small
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Tuesday x %NPL 29.595 6.810
(22.787) (10.417)
Post-AIG, pre-IOR x %NPL 42.356 ** b 0.865 b
(19.975) (6.436)
Post-IOR, pre-CPP x %NPL -14.912 c -58.576 *** c
(24.773) (7.843)
1 month post-CPP x %NPL 5.408 2.934
(12.302) (5.642)
2 months post-CPP x %NPL 23.506 6.001
(20.803) (4.618)
3 months post-CPP x %NPL 37.326 * 2.781
(21.428) (5.682)
4 months post-CPP x %NPL 5.814 30.751 *
(23.183) (17.008)
5 months post-CPP x %NPL 10.671 17.592
(22.396) (43.205)
2 weeks pre-Lehman x Assets 0.011 0.017
(0.043) (0.091)
1 week pre-Lehman x Assets 0.012 -0.178
(0.030) (0.150)
Friday x Assets -0.009 -0.022
(0.043) (0.051)
Monday x Assets -0.203 ** b -0.005 b
(0.084) (0.048)
Tuesday x Assets -0.112 b 0.144 * b
(0.078) (0.081)
Post-AIG, pre-IOR x Assets -0.175 ** 0.149
(0.071) (0.242)
Post-IOR, pre-CPP x Assets -0.247 ** a -5.467 *** a
(0.111) (0.937)
1 month post-CPP x Assets -0.221 *** 0.003
(0.079) (0.284)
2 months post-CPP x Assets -0.327 ** -0.316 **
(0.133) (0.126)
3 months post-CPP x Assets -0.174 -0.336
(0.135) (0.389)
4 months post-CPP x Assets -0.234 -0.285
(0.153) (0.237)
5 months post-CPP x Assets -0.349 ** -0.071
(0.160) (0.380)
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1 Fed funds are unsecured loans of reserve balances that financial institutions hold at the Federal Reserve banks. Fed funds loans 
are traded in an over-the-counter market, mostly overnight at a rate known as the fed funds rate. See Section II for a detailed 
description of the fed funds market. 
2 One possible exception is the model by Diamond and Rajan (2009) in which good banks might hoard liquidity to take 
advantage of future fire sales. 
3 For example, in the aftermath of the Bear Stearns’ near-bankruptcy we do not observe that amounts borrowed or interest rate 
spreads become more sensitive to the underlying bank characteristics, for example, NPLs. However, in general we do see that 
bank characteristics predict borrowing amounts and the number of banks willing to lend to a borrower.  
4 Using the same data set, Brunetti, Filippo, and Harris (2009) find decreased participation in interbank lending after August 2007 
and interpret the reduced participation of lenders as hoarding.  But it is difficult to assess whether this evidence indicates 
hoarding or a reluctance to participate in the e-MID open trading platform. 
5 The term fed funds market has been estimated to be one-tenth (Meulendyke (1998)) to one-half (Kuo, Skeie, and Vickery 
(2010)) of the size of the overnight market. 
6 See also Gorton and Metrick (2010) for a more detailed analysis of the impact of financial turmoil on repo haircuts. 
7 Banks can borrow from three discount window lending programs. Primary credit is extended to depository institutions with 
strong financial positions while secondary credit is offered to those institutions that do not qualify for primary credit. Small 
depository institutions in agricultural communities are the typical users of seasonal credit. 
8 Acceptable collateral includes U.S. government and agency securities, certain types of foreign sovereign debt obligations, 
municipal or corporate obligations of investment quality, commercial paper of investment quality, bank-issued assets by an 
institution in “sound financial condition,” and customer obligations that meet credit quality standards. 
9 Armantier et al. (2009) and Furfine (2003) find empirical evidence of discount window stigma. 
Large Small Large Small
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Borrower Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 13,864 1,698 13,864 1,698
Adjusted R2 0.22 0.14 0.26 0.15
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10 In March 17, 2008, the spread between the primary rate at the discount window and the federal funds target was narrowed from 
50 to 25 basis points and the maximum maturity of discount window loans extended from 30 to 90 days. 
11 The TAF was created on December 12, 2007 and provides term funding at interest rates and amounts set by biweekly auctions. 
Armantier, Krieger, and McAndrews (2008) present a detailed analysis of the liquidity conditions in the term funding markets 
leading up to the introduction of the TAF as well as the structure and results of the first 10 TAF auctions. See also 
http://atthebank.ny.frb.org/BankBusiness/facilities.shtml#taf for more information on the facility. 
12 Consolidated Reports of Income and Condition (FR Y-9C) are available from the Federal Reserve online at 
http://chicagofed.org/webpages/banking/financial_institution_reports/bhc_data.cfm. Data are available about two to three months 
after the end of each quarter (e.g., data for the third quarter of 2008 became available at the beginning of December 2008).  
13 These figures are available for a longer time period in the Internet Appendix. 
14The Financial Services Regulatory Relief Act of 2006 authorizes the Federal Reserve to pay interest on reserve balances and on 
excess balances held by or on behalf of depository institutions beginning October 1, 2011. The effective date of this authority was 
advanced to October 1, 2008 by the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008. Beginning on October 9, 2008 the interest 
rate paid on required reserve balances was 10 basis points below the average target federal funds rate over a reserve maintenance 
period while the rate for excess balances was set at 75 basis points below the lowest target federal funds rate for a reserve 
maintenance period. Since December 18, 2008 the Federal Reserve has paid 25 basis points on required reserve balances and 
excess balances.  
15 In October 2008, Treasury created the CPP to provide capital to viable banks through the purchase of banks’ preferred shares. 
In return for its investment, Treasury receives dividend payments and warrants.  
16 The Internet Appendix is available on the Journal of Finance website at http://www.afajof.org/supplements.asp. 
 
17 We measured the price of fed funds using the spread to the effective fed funds rate rather than to the target. Results for the 
interaction of bank characteristics were similar, although the positive coefficient on Monday September 15 was naturally 
reduced, since the effective rate was dramatically higher than the target rate on that day.  
18 We estimated similar results expanding the analysis to include banks that did not borrow, filling in the amount to be the log of 
one, effectively creating observations for banks that did not borrow on a given day with amounts of zero.  
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19 Although 360 banks borrowed in the fed funds market from April 1, 2008 to February 28, 2009, only 20 borrowed every day of 
this time period. 
20 Surprisingly, we do not consistently see a statistically significant flight to quality as measured by ROA or the risk ratio.  
21 Similarly, lower ROAs and lower risk ratios are associated with lower borrowing post-Lehman. 
22 We include as controls the amount borrowed on the most recent previous day. As a result, we exclude observations for which 
banks have not yet borrowed, resulting in a lower number of observations compared to the fed funds access analysis (Table IV). 
23 We estimate an OLS model of the pre-crisis relationship (January 1, 2007 to August 29, 2008) between the logarithm of 
amount borrowed and the following bank characteristics: daily: logarithm of average amount borrowed in the previous month, 
logarithm of customer funds sent, logarithm of customer funds received, and difference between reserve balance without fed 
funds transactions and required reserves (all from Federal Reserve databases); and quarterly: assets, ROA, risk ratio, % NPL, % 
MBS, % Repos (from the Y-9C). We include the following daily macroeconomic variables: target fed funds rate; one-month term 
rates on AA asset-backed commercial paper, certificates of deposit, financial commercial paper, LIBOR, and OIS; and overnight 
rates on Treasury repos and MBS repos. We allow fixed effects for end-of-maintenance period days, calendar months, and 
quarter-end dates, and estimate the model separately for small and large banks. We explain more than 60% of the variation in the 
amount borrowed with these variables. The results of the first-stage regression are shown in the Internet Appendix.  
24 See the Internet Appendix. 
25 Data are available at http://www.newyorkfed.org/markets/omo/dmm/fedfundsdata.cfm. 
26 Loosely speaking, Eurodollars are dollar-denominated deposits held outside the U.S.. For a more precise definition and 
discussion of the fed funds and Eurodollar markets, see Bartolini, Hilton, and Prati (2008). 
27 McAndrews (2009) tests the predictive power of the costumer code as a proxy for a Eurodollar loan by matching brokered 
trades provided by BGC Brokers with Fedwire settlement data. By using the absence of a costumer code as a proxy for fed funds, 
the probability of correctly identifying fed funds loans is 89%, with an 11% chance of counting Eurodollars as fed funds (type I 
error) and a 4% chance of incorrectly excluding fed funds (type II error). 
28 Small banks and institutions that do not have a reserve account at the Federal Reserve can settle fed funds transactions through 
the account of correspondent banks. They can also lend to correspondent banks using correspondent re-booking. Deposits these 
institutions hold at correspondent banks can be reclassified as overnight federal funds loans. Next day, the correspondent bank 
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credits the account of the lending institution with the nominal of the loan plus the negotiated interest. Rebooking does not require 
transfers between reserve accounts at the Federal Reserve and hence these uncollateralized interbank loans would not be 
identified as fed funds by the algorithm. 
 
 
 
